This book has presented a reconstruction of Deleuze's critical and clinical project, arguing that this must be grasped as incomplete in terms of Deleuze's own writings on the subject, but that it appears as a coherent set of concepts when read alongside the rest of his work. As a result, it has been necessary for me to present Deleuze's literary clinic in terms of the developments informing the early and middle sections of his career, while at the same time insisting that the methodological principles of immanent critique have remained consistent throughout. If literary criticism and questions of health and illness are inextricably linked, this is because, beginning with his early reading of Nietzsche, Deleuze discerned, at the origin of thought, an engagement with the unthinking body, with what I’ve called, borrowing Lyotard's term, ‘libidinal stupidity’. This is how we broached the question of the literary clinic in Chapter 1: thought is to be distinguished from general cognition in that it needs to be ‘forced’, or induced, by coming into contact with its other, with an unthought inherent within thought as a stubborn refusal to think. This ‘other’ is described by Deleuze and Guattari in terms of ‘pathic’ elements, those aspects of subjective experience which, in going beyond the linguistic, social and organic forms of personhood and consciousness, lead towards madness, intoxication and pathology. In other words, one only begins to think when one reaches the proper limits of subjective constitution. It is precisely these limits which give us the criteria for a purely impersonal thought, which Deleuze exhorted us to grasp as the singularity of ‘a’ life.