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10 - Buraimi and Anglo-American Relations, 1955-56

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 September 2025

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Summary

There was no great sympathy for Saudi Arabia over Buraimi in official circles in the Lebanon or Jordan. Both were aware of and subject to ‘the Saudis’ pernicious activities’ in the form of ‘lavish expenditure’ to influence public opinion in their own countries. In order to counter Saudi propaganda, the Jordanian prime minister agreed that the British side of the question should be covered in the Jordanian press. The Saudi government was quick to deny the accusations of bribery, condemned the U.K. government for the reoccupation of Buraimi and the western areas and demanded the withdrawal of the TOL and a return to arbitration. They refused to recognise the British declaration of the Riyad Line (as amended in 1937) and they hinted darkly that they intended to raise the matter in the U.N. The Saudi foreign minister, the Amir Faisal, in Cairo for a meeting of the Arab League's political committee fulminated against British perfidy. (He also took time to advocate the admission of ‘Oman’, to be an independent state separate from Muscat, to the League). In contrast to his foreign ministry officials, he announced that ‘Saudi Arabia had abandoned the idea of arbitration … and would now reconsider the situation.’ On the advice of its ARAMCO counsel, Young, the Saudi delegation to the U.N. then raised the matter, under Article 35 (1) of the U.N. Charter, as being a threat to ‘international peace and security’, requesting that the President of the Security Council circulate a letter to this effect to its members. The U.K. delegation immediately submitted a letter countering the Saudi version and ‘giving the facts of the situation regarding Buraimi.’ British diplomats in New York learnt that the U.S. delegation had seen the Saudi letter, courtesy of ARAMCO, before it had been submitted. The head of the U.K. delegation, Sir Pierson Dixon, anticipated that ‘the Americans would be rather shaky’ if the Saudis took the matter to the Security Council and suggested that the Foreign Office ask the State Department ‘to restrain’ the Saudis from this action. The Foreign Office realised that this was ‘the obvious way out’ for the Americans, who would be ‘in a delicate position’ if the Buraimi issue was brought to the Security Council.

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