A few days after the outbreak of war between Britain and Turkey on 31 October 1914 Sir Percy Cox wrote to the Amir ‘Abdul Aziz ibn Sa’ud inviting him to cooperate with the Shaikhs of Bahrain and Muhammarah in supporting a British attack upon Basra. Cox went on to say that, in return for Ibn Sa’ud's active participation in the war, the British government would be prepared to recognize him as independent ruler of Najd, Hasa and Qatif, to defend his coastline against any retaliatory, seaborne attacks by the Turks, and to conclude a treaty of friendship and protection with him. As it happened, Cox's letter crossed another written by the governor of Hasa, ‘Abdullah ibn Jiluwi, to Captain Shakespear (then at Bahrain), the purpose of which was to transmit a message from Ibn Sa’ud. The message, the first received from the Saudi amir since the conclusion of his agreement with the Porte the previous May, was, not surprisingly in the circumstances of the day, primarily concerned with explaining why he had concluded the agreement. What Ibn Sa’ud had to say did not add much to what was already known about the agreement, nor did his professions of friendship for ‘the Precious [British] Imperial Government’ carry a great deal of conviction. As Shakespear remarked in forwarding the letter to Cox, it merely confirmed that Ibn Sa’ud had taken up a position on the fence, with perhaps a slight bias in our favour’.

That Shakespear's scepticism was fully warranted was proved by the reply sent by Ibn Sa’ud to Cox's invitation. Aside from protestations about a common devotion to a common cause, viz., the defeat of the Turks, Ibn Sa’ud had little to say about actual military commitments. On the other hand, he welcomed Cox's offer of British recognition of his independence and of a treaty of friendship and protection. There is little doubt that Ibn Sa’ud's hatred of the Turks was genuine, or that he aspired to full independence. The fact remains, however, that both he and his father had made successive accommodations with the Porte, that they had accepted Turkish offices and titles, and that they had acknowledged themselves to be Turkish dependants. What was more, Ibn Sa’ud had not as yet repudiated his allegiance to the Porte. Instead, he had excused himself from engaging in active hostilities by invoking the necessity for him to remain on guard against any attempt by Ibn Rashid, his hereditary foe and ally of the Turks, to overthrow him.