Chapter 2 develops a theory explaining when states pursue arms control agreements and why they choose different levels of monitoring provisions. It argues that domestic political volatility in adversary states creates uncertainty about their incentives for cooperation, making formal agreements more likely through two distinct pathways. The "hedging" pathway occurs when states become uncertain about previously cooperative opponents and pursue low monitoring agreements rather than relying on informal coordination. The "risking" pathway emerges when states become uncertain about previously competitive opponents and pursue high monitoring treaties to cautiously seek cooperation benefits. The theory is built on a game theoretic model that analyzes how states select monitoring provisions based on their beliefs about adversary types and implementation challenges. The chapter identifies two key sources of domestic volatility that drive uncertainty: leadership/elite turnover and public pressure on governments. The theory generates testable hypotheses about when states will pursue agreements and what monitoring levels they will select, conditional on their baseline beliefs about adversary intentions. This framework provides new insights into the relationship between domestic politics, uncertainty, and international security cooperation.