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3 - The Effects of Political Volatility

A Quantitative Analysis of Agreements

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2026

Jane Vaynman
Affiliation:
Johns Hopkins University
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Summary

Chapter 3 provides the first comprehensive quantitative analysis testing the relationship between domestic political volatility and arms control agreement design. Using an original dataset of 225 arms control agreements from 1816 to 2010, the analysis examines how domestic political shifts affect both the likelihood of agreements and their monitoring provisions. The study operationalizes two types of volatility – leadership/cabinet changes and public demonstrations/unrest – and examines their effects conditional on states’ prior beliefs about adversaries’ cooperative intentions, measured through similarity in UN voting patterns. The results support the theory: domestic political volatility is associated with a 47–70 percent increased likelihood of arms control agreements overall. Moreover, the effects on agreement design are conditional on baseline beliefs – when states view adversaries as likely cooperators, volatility increases the probability of low monitoring agreements by about 50 percent. When states view adversaries as likely competitors, volatility increases the probability of high monitoring agreements by about 200 percent. These effects persist when controlling for other factors like power balance, recent conflict, and technological capabilities. The findings support the hypotheses that politically generated uncertainty creates opportunities for international cooperation, with statistical evidence showing a robust correlation between domestic volatility and specific forms of arms control agreements.

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