INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to highlight the existence of two, sharply contrasted, views of the rivalrous emotions in Greek and Roman philosophy. One view is that rivalrous emotions may be either virtuous or defective; this view, for which Aristotle provides our best evidence, reflects conventional thought about emotions and social relations in Graeco-Roman culture. The contrasting view is that rivalrous emotions are necessarily misguided and defective. This view represents a critique of conventional thought; it is an especially prominent theme in Plato, Epicurus and the Stoics.

This contrast of attitudes might be explained in several different ways. I explain it by reference to the ethical framework presupposed in each case, in particular, by beliefs about the nature of the human good. This line of explanation can be placed in a larger conceptual framework and one which links this discussion with others in this volume. A key issue for this topic (as for emotions generally) is whether we should assume that we can define a universal framework for understanding the rivalrous emotions or, rather, that such emotions can only be understood in culturally specific terms. I do not attempt here to explore that issue; but the question I do pursue (on the importance of the conception of the human good) has a bearing on that larger issue. This point can be brought out by the following suggestion, which is partly based on Alasdair MacIntyre's famous study of ethical theory, After Virtue.3 One might suggest that all human societies have ideas about rivalrous emotions or dispositions and that these ideas are broadly analogous.