This chapter provides the empirical evidence for the book’s theoretical framework by introducing a new Coercion in Interstate Militarized Conflict (CIMC) dataset. Comprising ninety-nine post-World War II crises from 1945 to 2018, the CIMC categorizes conflicts based on the coercer’s demands (major or minor), threats (denial or punishment), and outcomes. By filtering these historical cases through the militarized conflict model, the chapter systematically distinguishes between coercive diplomacy, military coercion, and overall foreign policy success or failure. The quantitative analysis reveals a pattern: while coercive strategies fail to secure target concessions in over half of the cases, coercers still achieve their broader foreign policy objectives 59 percent of the time, often by subsequently escalating to brute force. The chapter isolates forty-three instances where targets resisted and threats were imposed, identifying eleven distinct cases of “insincere coercion.” In these specific cases, coercers knowingly issued ultimatums they expected and/or intended to fail. By mapping these historical events onto the book’s four-part typology, mobilizing support, moving the goalposts, making an example, and restoring deterrence, this chapter validates that insincere coercion is a recurrent, rational, and consequential phenomenon in modern international conflict.