This conclusion synthesizes the book’s investigation into the puzzle of insincere coercion: why states often adopt coercive strategies they expect and/or intend to fail. Reviewing the book’s multimethod approach, the chapter first revisits the militarized conflict model and the four distinct rationales for insincere coercion introduced in Chapter 1. It then highlights the quantitative findings from the Coercion in Interstate Militarized Conflict (CIMC) database introduced in Chapter 2, which demonstrate that insincere coercion is frequent, occurring in a quarter of cases where the target resisted coercive demands. Furthermore, the broader empirical record since 1945 reveals that coercers successfully achieved their foreign policy objectives 59 percent of the time through the threat or use of violence. It further demonstrates how intentional coercion failure often contributed to foreign policy success. By consolidating insights from five detailed case studies, the book shows how and why decision-makers, rather than stumbling into war, may calculate that insincere coercion can facilitate obtaining foreign policy objectives unattainable through threats alone. The book offers lessons along with a critical framework for future foreign policy analysis.