This chapter introduces the final of four explanations for insincere coercion: restoring deterrence. Analyzing the 2006 Second Lebanon War between Israel and Hezbollah, the chapter explains why a coercer might deliberately continue to inflict punishment even after it becomes clear the target will not concede. Though Hezbollah is not a state actor, it has many of its attributes, and this chapter expands the scope conditions to test a theory of insincere coercion. In the conflict, after initial airstrikes failed to compel Hezbollah to release Israeli hostages or cease rocket fire, Israel instituted a punishment strategy by targeting the homes of Hezbollah members and supporters. Although this massive destruction did not resolve the immediate crisis through coercion, it served a broader strategic purpose: altering Hezbollah’s calculus for future conflicts. By imposing higher-than-anticipated costs, Israel successfully increased Hezbollah’s expected price for initiating subsequent crises. The chapter also utilizes a formal deterrence model to demonstrate how a punishment strategy impacts the probability of maintaining long-term peace. Ultimately, the case illustrates how intentional coercion failure and sustained punishment can restore deterrence, in the case of Hezbollah, leading to fifteen years of quiet along the Israel–Lebanon border.