During much of the Cold War, HUMINT capacity building did not have to survive public scrutiny. In order to be positively assessed by national governments, behind closed doors, its end product had to satisfy no more than a single requirement. What the Swedish security agency chief cited earlier called the ‘spirit of the times’ prevented agencies from making that requirement explicit: only in works of fiction could it be acknowledged that in intelligence and national security, an operation was a good one as long as it ‘satisfied the only requirement of our profession: it worked’. On no side of the iron and bamboo curtains in the real world did additional requirements – party political, statutory legal, ethical, religious, and so on – ever acquire more than secondary status. As motifically encoded in Part II above, capacity building entailed a diachronic process of identification, endorsement, and promotion of agent running tradecraft aimed squarely at increasing the advance odds that HUMINT ‘worked’. In Part III below, the synchronic structure of corresponding relationships that ensued has been motifically encoded as best practice.