1. Universal History

The problem of universal history does not result from the possibility of organising the universe in time, but rather from considering time as a universe. How is it possible to grasp time – structured by the present (maximal presence), the past (weakening of presence), and the future (maximal absence) – as a cumulative order of all past instants, from the most remote to the most present? We raised this question in Chapter III of this book. Universal history inscribes objects and events in an order of comprehension, which leads to the present and points towards the future. The cultural structuring of time as if it were a universe yields two difficulties. First, temporally, the past is to the present as less presence is to more presence, and no continuity exists between past, present, and future. The future is to the present as maximum absence is to maximum presence. The past, a progressive weakening of presence, is comprehended in the present. Therefore, one can never trace a continuous arrow beginning in the past, passing through the present, and directed at the future. Second, the past is comprehended in the present, the greatest possible presence. By definition, the present is the universe (the biggest possible thing) of the past. Therefore, one can never place the past and the present together in something bigger, that we could call history, which would embody their common universe. The past is in the present – but past and present together are in nothing that one commonly calls ‘history’.

The past alone remains to be ordered in history. But the present still acts as a placeholder, a universal container of the past. In truth, the past is not in history, but always already in the present.

Universal history – cultural time considered generally as a universe – cannot function unless it is identified with the present.