from Part II - Coalitional Bargaining Games
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2026
Coalitional bargaining arises in many political and economic situations. This chapter presents three applications of the random proposer model for cooperative TU games and pure bargaining problems: bargaining in legislatures, labour markets, and international climate agreements. In Part III, we will provide further applications of coalitional bargaining to efficient renegotiations (Chapter 8), climate cooperation and free-riding (Chapter 9), and trading under uncertainty (Chapter 10).
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