from Part IV - Auctions and Internet Advertising Markets
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 August 2026
This chapter introduces auction markets with budgets, a model capturing settings such as the large internet advertising platforms operated by Google and Meta. We introduce two equilibrium notions that model the steady-state outcomes of the budget-management tools used by these platforms to handle advertiser budget constraints. First, we study the second-price pacing equilibrium, and then the first-price pacing equilibrium. For both equilibrium concepts, we study their existence and computability properties, as well as how they relate to game-theoretic equilibria and market equilibria.
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