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2 - Crisis Bargaining under Complete Information

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  aN Invalid Date NaN

Ahmer Tarar
Affiliation:
Texas A & M University
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Summary

This chapter analyzes crisis bargaining models under complete information. It begins with a finite-action model in which the disputed good is treated as indivisible, and shows that war can occur even under complete information because of the indivisibility. It then analyzes an ultimatum divisible-good model, establishes the existence of a bargaining range of agreements that both sides prefer to war, and shows that war never occurs under complete information. It then introduces a status-quo division of the disputed good and formalizes the notion of a country being satisfied or dissatisfied with the status quo. Finally, it analyzes two infinite-horizon crisis bargaining models loosely based on the Rubinstein bargaining model, which is also presented and analyzed. It is shown that the results of the infinite-horizon models are largely similar to those of the simpler ultimatum model, and hence the latter is generally preferred in applied work. The exercises ask the reader to analyze many variants of crisis bargaining models, applying the baseline model to many different theories of international conflict.

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