Book contents
- Gauging China’s Influence Abroad
- Gauging China’s Influence Abroad
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- 1 An Introduction to Gauging China’s Influence Abroad
- 2 The China Threat
- 3 The Limits of China’s Influence
- 4 The Dragon in Thailand and Cambodia
- 5 Tracing China’s Influence and Its Limits in the Philippines
- 6 China’s Influencing Maneuver in South Korea
- 7 Why Money Can’t Buy Everything
- 8 Tracing China’s Influence in South Asia
- 9 Australia and China
- 10 Structure, Geography, and Agency
- 11 Sino-Russian Cooperation and Competition in Central Asian Higher Educational Exchange
- 12 Assessing China’s Belt and Road Initiative
- 13 Conclusion
- Index
- References
7 - Why Money Can’t Buy Everything
Understanding the Limits of China’s Economic Statecraft in Japan
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 July 2026
Edited by
Book contents
- Gauging China’s Influence Abroad
- Gauging China’s Influence Abroad
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- 1 An Introduction to Gauging China’s Influence Abroad
- 2 The China Threat
- 3 The Limits of China’s Influence
- 4 The Dragon in Thailand and Cambodia
- 5 Tracing China’s Influence and Its Limits in the Philippines
- 6 China’s Influencing Maneuver in South Korea
- 7 Why Money Can’t Buy Everything
- 8 Tracing China’s Influence in South Asia
- 9 Australia and China
- 10 Structure, Geography, and Agency
- 11 Sino-Russian Cooperation and Competition in Central Asian Higher Educational Exchange
- 12 Assessing China’s Belt and Road Initiative
- 13 Conclusion
- Index
- References
Summary
Why has China’s growing economic leverage over Japan failed to translate into consistent political influence? This chapter develops a theoretical framework to explain the limited effectiveness of economic statecraft in contemporary Japan–China relations. While existing literature emphasizes economic interdependence as a source of influence, it argues that successful coercion requires three critical conditions to align simultaneously: acute economic vulnerability, cohesive domestic lobbying, and political flexibility. Through structured comparison of three cases (the 2012–2013 Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, the 2022–2023 semiconductor export controls, and the 2023 Fukushima water release), this chapter demonstrates that Chinese economic coercion consistently failed due to the absence of one or more of these conditions. By disaggregating the mechanisms through which economic pressure translates (or fails to translate) into policy change, this framework advances understanding of why economic statecraft often falters against developed democracies with robust institutions and dense alliance networks, even when asymmetric dependence exists.
Keywords
Information
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Gauging China's Influence AbroadTheory and Practice, pp. 195 - 223Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2026
References
Al Jazeera. (2012a). “Islands Dispute Hits China–Japan Trade Ties.” September 17. www.aljazeera.com/news/2012/9/17/islands-dispute-hits-china-japan-trade-ties.Google Scholar
Al Jazeera (2012b). “Protests in China Hit Japanese Companies.” September 17. www.aljazeera.com/news/2012/9/17/protests-in-china-hit-japanese-companies.Google Scholar
Allen, Michael A. (2008). “The Domestic Politics of International Relations: The Role of Economic Interest Groups in Foreign Policy.” Foreign Policy Analysis 4(2): 107–129.Google Scholar
Baldwin, David A. (1985). Economic Statecraft. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Brooks, Stephen G., and Wohlforth, William C.. (2022). “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers in the Twenty-First Century: China’s Rise and the Fate of America’s Global Position.” International Security 40(3): 7–53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). (2023). “CSIS Translation: Updated Japanese Export Controls on High-Performance Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment.” September 7. www.csis.org/analysis/csis-translation-updated-japanese-export-controls-high-performance-semiconductor.Google Scholar
Chen, Cheng, Senga, Tatsuro, Sun, Chang, and Zhang, Hongyong. (2016). Firm Expectations and Investment: Evidence from the China–Japan Island Dispute. RIETI Discussion Paper Series 16-E-090. Tokyo: Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry. www.rieti.go.jp/jp/publications/dp/16e090.pdf.Google Scholar
CNN. (2023). “Japan’s Seafood Crisis after China Ban.” CNN. August 23. https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/23/asia/japan-fukushima-water-release-thursday-intl-hnk.Google Scholar
Mark, Copelovitch, and Pevehouse, Jon C. W.. (2014). “Ties That Bind? Preferential Trade Agreements and Exchange Rate Policy Choice.” International Studies Quarterly 58(2): 385–399.Google Scholar
Deutsche Welle. (2023). “Japan Announces Seafood Aid after Fukushima Water Release.” DW. August 25. www.dw.com/en/japan-announces-seafood-aid-after-fukushima-water-release/a-66720333.Google Scholar
Drifte, Reinhard. (2014). “The Japan–China Confrontation over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands – Between ‘Shelving’ and ‘Dispute Escalation.’” Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus. 12(30): e3. July 27. https://apjjf.org/2014/12/30/reinhard-drifte/4154/article.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Duan, Xiaolin, and Yufan, Hao. (2025). “Surprising Stability in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands since 2012.” Washington Quarterly 48(2): 59–75. https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2025.2516977.Google Scholar
Farrell, Henry, and Newman, Abraham L.. (2019). “Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion.” International Security 44(1): 42–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Galtung, Johan. (1967). “On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia.” World Politics 19(3): 378–416. https://doi.org/10.2307/2009785.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gourevitch, Peter. (1978). “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics.” International Organization 32(4): 881–912.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Government of Japan. (2022). National Security Strategy of Japan (Provisional Translation). December 16. www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf.Google Scholar
Grieger, Gisela. (2021). “Sino-Japanese Controversy over the Senkaku/Diaoyu/Diaoyutai Islands.” European Parliamentary Research Service. www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/696183/EPRS_BRI(2021)696183_EN.pdf.Google Scholar
Hirschman, Albert O. (1945). National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade. Berkeley: University of California Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). (2023). “Frequently Asked Questions: Fukushima Daiichi Treated Water Release.” July 4. www.iaea.org/topics/response/fukushima-daiichi-nuclear-accident/fukushima-daiichi-alps-treated-water-discharge/faq.Google Scholar
Japan Echo. (2023). “60% in Japan Support Fukushima Water Release.” Nippon.com. September 7. www.nippon.com/en/japan-data/h01816.Google Scholar
Japan Times. (2012). “Japanese Car Sales Down in China.” October 14. www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2012/10/14/editorials/japanese-car-sales-down-in-china.Google Scholar
Jervis, Robert. (1976). Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Keidanren. (2023). Annual Report 2023. www.keidanren.or.jp/en/profile/Keidanren_Annual_Report2023.pdf.Google Scholar
Keohane, Robert O., and Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (1977). Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Boston, MA: Little, Brown.Google Scholar
Kim, Sung Eun, and Margalit, Yotam. (2021). “Tariffs as Electoral Weapons: The Political Geography of the US–China Trade War.” International Organization 75(1): 1–38. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818320000612.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kirshner, Jonathan. (1997). Currency and Coercion: The Political Economy of International Monetary Power. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Kyodo News. (2023). “Japan to Give Extra ¥20.7 Billion to Fisheries amid China Import Ban.” Kyodo News. September 4. https://english.kyodonews.net/articles/-/43350.Google Scholar
METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Japan). (2023). “Strengthening Export Control Measures on Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment.” March 31. www.meti.go.jp/english/speeches/press_conferences/2023/0331001.html.Google Scholar
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. (2023). “G7 Leaders’ Statement on Fukushima Water Release.” August 22. www.mofa.go.jp/files/100506878.pdf.Google Scholar
Nakayama, Shigeki. (2023). “Japan’s Chip Equipment Makers Face New Challenges amid Export Controls.” Nikkei Asia. July 26. https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Tech/Semiconductors/Japan-s-chip-equipment-makers-face-new-challenges-amid-export-controls.Google Scholar
Olson, Mancur. (1982). The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Panda, Jagannath. (2021). “‘China Plus One’: Supply Chain Resilience Initiative and Beijing in Indo-Pacific.” Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, India. https://coilink.org/20.500.12592/260hvv.Google Scholar
Reilly, James. (2013). Strong Society, Smart State: The Rise of Public Opinion in China’s Japan Policy. New York: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
Slantchev, Branislav L. (2011). Military Threats: The Costs of Coercion and the Price of Peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, Paul J. (2013). “The Senkaku/Diaoyu Island Controversy: A Crisis Postponed.” Naval War College Review 66(2): Article 5. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1369&context=nwc-review.Google Scholar
Solís, Mireya, and Duchâtel, Mathieu. (2023). “Japan’s Semiconductor Export Controls: De-risking without Decoupling.” Brookings Institution. August 1. www.brookings.edu/articles/japans-semiconductor-export-controls-de-risking-without-decoupling.Google Scholar
(2024). “The Renaissance of the Japanese Semiconductor Industry.” Brookings Institution. June 3. www.brookings.edu/articles/the-renaissance-of-the-japanese-semiconductor-industry.Google Scholar
Tatsumi, Yuki. (2013). Senkaku Islands/East China Sea Disputes: A Japanese Perspective. Washington, DC: Stimson Center. www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/file-attachments/Yuki-CNA_paper_8-2013_1.pdf.Google Scholar
US Congressional Research Service. (2017). The Senkakus (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Dispute: US Treaty Obligations. February 21. www.congress.gov/crs-product/R42761.Google Scholar
Wang, Cindy. (2023). “China Warns Japan over Chip Curbs as Tensions Simmer.” Bloomberg. March 31. www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-31/china-warns-japan-over-chip-curbs-as-tensions-simmer.Google Scholar
Weeks, Jessica L. P. (2008). “Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve.” International Organization 62(1): 35–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Young, Angelo. (2013). “Japanese Automakers Hope for Better Year in China: Tensions between Japan and China Resulted in Lean Times for Japanese Automakers. Can They Bounce Back?” The Diplomat. January 10. https://thediplomat.com/2013/01/japanese-automakers-hope-for-better-year-in-china.Google Scholar
Accessibility standard: WCAG 2.1 AA
Why this information is here
This section outlines the accessibility features of this content - including support for screen readers, full keyboard navigation and high-contrast display options. This may not be relevant for you.Accessibility Information
The HTML of this chapter
complies with version 2.1 of the
Web Content Accessibility Guidelines
(WCAG), covering newer accessibility requirements and improved
user experiences and achieves the intermediate
(AA)
level of WCAG compliance, covering a wider range of accessibility requirements.
Content Navigation
Table of contents navigation
Allows you to navigate directly to chapters, sections, or non‐text items through a linked table of contents, reducing the need for extensive scrolling.
Allows you to navigate directly to chapters, sections, or non‐text items through a linked table of contents, reducing the need for extensive scrolling.
Index navigation
Provides an interactive index, letting you go straight to where a term or subject appears in the text without manual searching.
Provides an interactive index, letting you go straight to where a term or subject appears in the text without manual searching.
Reading Order & Textual Equivalents
Single logical reading order
You will encounter all content (including footnotes, captions, etc.) in a clear, sequential flow, making it easier to follow with assistive tools like screen readers.
You will encounter all content (including footnotes, captions, etc.) in a clear, sequential flow, making it easier to follow with assistive tools like screen readers.
Short alternative textual descriptions
You get concise descriptions (for images, charts, or media clips), ensuring you do not miss crucial information when visual or audio elements are not accessible.
You get concise descriptions (for images, charts, or media clips), ensuring you do not miss crucial information when visual or audio elements are not accessible.
Full alternative textual descriptions
You get more than just short alt text: you have comprehensive text equivalents, transcripts, captions, or audio descriptions for substantial non‐text content, which is especially helpful for complex visuals or multimedia.
You get more than just short alt text: you have comprehensive text equivalents, transcripts, captions, or audio descriptions for substantial non‐text content, which is especially helpful for complex visuals or multimedia.
Visual Accessibility
Use of colour is not sole means of conveying information
You will still understand key ideas or prompts without relying solely on colour, which is especially helpful if you have colour vision deficiencies.
You will still understand key ideas or prompts without relying solely on colour, which is especially helpful if you have colour vision deficiencies.
Structural and Technical Features
ARIA roles provided
You gain clarity from ARIA (Accessible Rich Internet Applications) roles and attributes, as they help assistive technologies interpret how each part of the content functions.
You gain clarity from ARIA (Accessible Rich Internet Applications) roles and attributes, as they help assistive technologies interpret how each part of the content functions.