Do legislatures possess the capacity – and the will – to temper the agenda‑setting power of outsiders? This chapter probes that question by comparing bills drafted by external actors with those written inside the chamber. If outsider bills look systematically different and survive the process with fewer changes, they may reflect strategic behavior that limits deliberation and shifts representational duty away from elected lawmakers. After outlining benchmarks for “legislative quality,” I employ large‑scale textual analysis to track complexity, readability, and changes. Outsider‑authored bills are markedly more complex and emerge from the process largely intact. Business‑sponsored bills are especially opaque, while departmental proposals adapt to context: They are simpler in low‑professionalism states but denser where legislatures have greater capacity. These patterns imply that sophisticated actors tailor texts to the audience, and that lawmakers often accept the drafts with minimal scrutiny. The findings may raise normative red flags: reliance on outsider language may preserve valuable expertise, yet it can also entrench narrow interests and erode democratic deliberation when representatives do not rewrite or fully vet the legislation they introduce.