Among the many strategic and economic issues facing the Gulf in the coming years, those relating to the Indian Ocean are likely to be among the most important and perhaps the most challenging. In the re-ordering of global economic and political power which is currently underway, the Indian Ocean constitutes a key arena for regional and global competition and rivalry. It could also, in a more hopeful scenario, become the setting for effective conflict-resolution and regional/international cooperation. The economic interests and perhaps stability of the Gulf states will be affected by which of the scenarios holds sway.

The Gulf states, however, need not be simply the victims of events. The resolution of existing divisions and tensions in the Gulf can ensure that potential rivalries between major powers in the Indian Ocean are less likely to affect the Gulf region. Given a more settled situation within the Gulf itself, moreover, the Gulf states could play a proactive role in the promotion of Indian Ocean stability and security, working with other Indian Ocean states to develop institutional structures and practices which encourage cooperation and provide avenues for conflict resolution. They have everything to gain from such a strategy.

It is only relatively recently that the Gulf countries, despite their historical involvement in and across the Indian Ocean, have begun to focus their strategic attention on the Indian Ocean. Clearly they have had a long-standing engagement with the individual states around the Indian Ocean, but these have been bilateral relationships – not conceived within the framework of an overall strategy for the region. Today there is a growing consciousness in the Gulf of the strategic issues arising in the Indian Ocean, and of the possible threats to the sea-lanes which carry their trade – whether stemming from asymmetric warfare and terrorism (as with the piracy off the coasts of Somalia and in the Arabian Sea) or from conflicts between major powers competing for dominance in the Indian Ocean. A number of Gulf countries now have base facilities in Indian Ocean states on the African coast. Still today, however, there is little sign that any Gulf country has developed a coherent and orchestrated approach to the region.

This book is intended to contribute to (or perhaps initiate) discussion of the possible role which Gulf states can play in the Indian Ocean region. Such a discussion requires an understanding of what economic interests are at stake for Gulf states, what resources of naval and military power are at their disposal, and what political benefits and dangers can ensue from the various policy options available.