Chapter 7 is a critical analysis of Platonic ontology as interpreted by Strauss, Gadamer, and Krüger. In light of philosophy’s finitude revealed through the philosopher’s philosophical journey, how can we think of Platonic Forms after Heidegger? I argue that Gadamer, Strauss, and Krüger articulate interpretations of Platonic metaphysics that concludes that, for Plato, Being remains fundamentally elusive. Strauss does so via a zetetic interpretation of Forms as questions coeval with the human mind: Being remains a mystery, a riddle. Gadamer achieves this through a somewhat technical account of Forms in light of an arithmetic interpretation of our linguistic access to them. Krüger originally puts at the center of his account the erotic tension between discursive thinking and non-discursive insight. I contend that Krüger’s Platonic argument for the elusiveness of Being is superior to those of Strauss and Gadamer in two respects: (1) it is more faithful to Plato’s own writings on the difference between dianoia and noêsis, and (2) it proves a better response to Heidegger’s critique of Platonic metaphysics.