Two of Leviathan’s most notable departures from earlier versions of Hobbes’s political theory are its introduction of a concept of “authorization” to describe the relation between subjects and their sovereign, and a vast expansion of Hobbes’s treatment of Judeo-Christian doctrine, history, and ecclesiology in Parts III and IV. The chapter argues that with his innovation of the idea of authorization in Leviathan, Hobbes unintentionally introduces an antinomy of reason into his political philosophy. Hobbes expanded his treatment of revealed religion because he viewed it as an important source of political instability. He deployed several philosophical distinctions to show that moral responsibility for wrongful action done only in obedience to one’s sovereign’s command lies with the sovereign who wills the performance of the action rather than with the merely obedient subject through whose instrumentality the action occurs. Leviathan’s novel doctrine of authorization, imagining subjects each “to own and acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever” the sovereign “shall act or cause to be acted” (17.13), aimed to insulate the sovereign from subjects’ criticism of its wrongful commands/actions by shifting responsibility onto subjects. After considering the antinomy generated by Hobbes’s introduction of the concept of authorization, the chapter proposes a resolution.