The previous chapter showed how laws that govern public property subject unhoused persons to two unique forms of double domination. First, others exert control over unhoused persons’ opportunities to obey these laws. Second, people experiencing homelessness must make nonegalitarian trade-offs to comply with laws that regulate public property.
This chapter explains why unhoused persons suffer these forms of domination. It demonstrates why the State has more power to regulate and police unhoused persons compared to people with access to housing, which will be referred to as “nonegalitarian coercion.”Footnote 1 This disparity exists because the State can more justifiably prohibit and police need-alleviating conduct that occurs on public property than on private property.Footnote 2
Nonegalitarian coercion constitutes a form of domination that shapes how laws that govern public property operate differently for unhoused persons. For people with access to housing, these laws function more like typical crimes that proscribe positive acts and that limit freedom minimally. In contrast, for unhoused persons, laws that govern public property operate more like crimes of omission that impose affirmative duties to act and that restrict liberty significantly.Footnote 3 Unhoused persons have a positive duty to secure access to a private place to alleviate their needs lawfully.Footnote 4 They suffer domination because others exert control over whether they fulfil that duty and avoid coercion, and because they must make nonegalitarian trade-offs to obey the law.Footnote 5 This chapter’s concluding parts elucidate why the State can more easily regulate and police unhoused persons than people with access to housing and explain why it constitutes a form of vertical domination.
5.1 The Role of Public Property
Public property’s role and the justifications for protecting it help explain why the State has more power to regulate and police unhoused persons compared to people with access to housing. Although there are many descriptions of “public property,” this chapter adopts Michael Robertson’s definition.Footnote 6 According to Robertson:
Public property is a type of common property that is owned by the State, but to which the general public has a broad right of access. The strong right to exclude non-owners, which the State enjoys with respect to state property (private property owned by the State), does not exist with public property, although the State, as owner, can still make rules to manage the public access efficiently, equitably, and safely.Footnote 7
Public property has two notable characteristics. First, individuals lack a private power to exclude others on public property.Footnote 8 Second, individuals have a general right of access to public property, subject to regulations that govern its use.Footnote 9 Jeremy Waldron observes that public property encompasses places that are “fairly accessible to everyone” and “where anyone may be,” such as streets, sidewalks, parks, public squares, and beaches.Footnote 10 For public property to operate as a truly open-access space, all community members must be able to share its use.
Public property fulfils several fundamental roles within society. First, it serves an important communal and social function.Footnote 11 Public places such as parks, streets, and beaches allow for commerce, the free exchange of ideas, recreation, social gatherings, and relaxation.Footnote 12 Carol Rose explains that public property’s value stems from the fact that each individual’s presence can reinforce a sense of community, solidarity, and togetherness.Footnote 13 There is also a connection between the role of public property and the instilment of civic virtue.Footnote 14 Public property’s communal nature incentivizes individuals to learn to live together despite their conflicting interests and expectations.Footnote 15
Second, public property furthers certain democratic values.Footnote 16 Free access to public property allows for organized demonstrations against the State and other entities, promotes freedom of speech, and fosters freedom of association.Footnote 17 The US and Canadian supreme courts have also recognized that public property advances these types of values that are important for a democracy.Footnote 18
Third, public property safeguards liberty outside of one’s home. It ensures that individuals can use open-access spaces without being subject to others’ exclusionary power or agenda-setting authority.Footnote 19 Public property helps guarantee that persons can freely travel between locations and engage in certain conduct in the public sphere without the risk of interference by others.Footnote 20 Individuals would constantly be subject to others’ power of exclusion if all land were privatized.Footnote 21 Rightsholders could refuse to let others pass through their land.Footnote 22 Without public property, individuals who attempt to leave their private property would face horizontal domination as they could constantly be excluded from others’ land.Footnote 23 Public property thus promotes liberty in the public sphere because it neutralizes the horizontal domination that would exist if all land were privatized.Footnote 24
5.2 Justifications for Regulating Public Property
5.2.1 General Justifications for Regulating Public Property
The open-access nature of areas such as parks, streets, public squares, and beaches generates certain risks related to public property’s communal value. Individuals share similar goals and desires when using these spaces.Footnote 25 But they also have opposing expectations about how public property can and should be used.Footnote 26 Each person’s rational attempt to derive the greatest benefit from public property can lead to collectively irrational outcomes; namely, the decline of public property’s shared value for all.Footnote 27
Garrett Hardin famously referred to this collective action problem as a “tragedy of the commons.”Footnote 28 Hardin summarized: “Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.”Footnote 29 Hardin argued that different forms of mutual coercion are necessary to prevent a tragedy of the commons.Footnote 30 These include a private property scheme, taxation, and laws that govern public property.Footnote 31 These forms of mutual coercion help prevent congestion, overexploitation, rivalry between users, and usages of public property that decrease its shared value or limit others’ liberty to use these spaces on equal terms.Footnote 32
Some contend that the State must regulate public property to prevent a tragedy of the urban commons.Footnote 33 Robert Ellickson and Robert Teir argue that laws that govern public property promote individual freedom because they allow people with opposing expectations to use public space on equal terms.Footnote 34 They suggest that when the State does not enforce such laws, public property’s value will decline, which discourages individuals from using it.Footnote 35
Sheila Foster contends that a tragedy of the urban commons can occur from regulatory slippage.Footnote 36 The term “regulatory slippage” implies that local governments underenforce laws that regulate public property, or increasingly tolerate acts that undermine its collective value.Footnote 37 Lax enforcement standards can lead to public property’s congestion and overexploitation.Footnote 38 Congestion and overexploitation can produce rivalry between users, and may lead some persons to avoid public property.Footnote 39
Similarly, George Kelling and Catherine Coles posit that underenforcement can result in a tragedy of the urban commons.Footnote 40 In their view, enforcement failure leads to a rise of suboptimal norms on public property that prevent or discourage others from using it.Footnote 41 A tragedy of the commons occurs when underenforcement allows suboptimal norms to displace optimal ones, such that public property’s shared value declines.Footnote 42
5.2.2 Specific Justifications for Regulating Public Property
These accounts highlight that public property’s shared value will deteriorate when “anything goes” in these spaces.Footnote 43 These same accounts illustrate how the State must regulate public property to safeguard its collective worth and ensure that all persons can enjoy its use on equal terms. Canadian and US courts have decided that the State (including local governments) can justifiably regulate public property for these reasons.Footnote 44 Judicial decisions affirm that there are several justifications for laws that govern public property.
First, courts acknowledge that the State can regulate public property to promote sanitation and safety.Footnote 45 For example, in Abbotsford (City) v. Shantz, the British Columbia (BC) Supreme Court recognized that a homeless encampment created certain public health and safety risks due to violence and the accumulation of garbage and human waste.Footnote 46 In the Supreme Court of California decision Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, the court observed that the city could prohibit camping on public property to promote sanitation and public health.Footnote 47 The court explained: “Adoption of the ordinance was clearly within the police power of the city, which may ‘make and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws’.”Footnote 48 Other US courts agree on these points.Footnote 49
Second, courts acknowledge that cities can regulate public property to protect its aesthetic quality, foster its attractiveness, and promote the city’s economic vitality.Footnote 50 In the Adams decision, the BC Court of Appeal concluded that the city can prohibit camping on public property to maintain “the environmental, recreational and social benefits of urban parks” and protect “the economic viability of adjacent areas.”Footnote 51 The Court remarked that the city of Victoria “bears the responsibility to the public to preserve public places for the use of all.”Footnote 52 In the US Supreme Court decision Clark v. CCNV, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a federal law that banned camping in national parks not designated for that purpose for similar reasons.Footnote 53 The majority concluded that certain acts that occur on public property discourage others from using it.Footnote 54 In Joyce v. City and County of San Francisco, the court affirmed that the State can enact laws that protect public property to promote economic vitality.Footnote 55 In that case, the city estimated that homelessness resulted in an estimated loss of $173 million in sales.Footnote 56 The court recognized that the city had constitutional authority to regulate public property and to prohibit acts such as camping, urinating, and defecating.Footnote 57
Third, the State can regulate public property to solve coordination problems and promote efficiency.Footnote 58 Courts uphold laws that prohibit individuals from obstructing streets and sidewalks so that pedestrians and goods can move efficiently between places.Footnote 59 These laws are also upheld because they minimize congestion and optimize the flow of traffic on public ways.Footnote 60
5.3 Nonegalitarian Coercion
The State has more power to regulate and to police unhoused persons compared to people with access to housing. This disparity exists for the following reasons. The justifications for regulating need-alleviating conduct on public property either do not apply to private property or are outweighed by the protection of individual interests within the home.Footnote 61 Housing safeguards individuals against laws that regulate their most basic human acts.Footnote 62 People experiencing homelessness lack that protection. For this reason, the State has more power to regulate and police their basic human acts.
Nonegalitarian coercion is comprised of two components: nonegalitarian regulation and nonegalitarian enforcement. Nonegalitarian regulation refers to how the State can enact laws that govern unhoused persons disparately because they lack private property rights.Footnote 63 Nonegalitarian enforcement, on the other hand, implies that law enforcement has more power to police unhoused persons for that same reason.
5.4 Nonegalitarian Regulation
5.4.1 The State’s Greater Capacity to Regulate Unhoused Persons
Nonegalitarian regulation occurs because the same act affects interests differently when done on public property as opposed to private property. This distinction is exemplified by how the law prohibits some conduct in public spaces yet permits it in private.Footnote 64 Nearly every city prohibits defecation on public property yet allows individuals to defecate at home in their bathroom. The State forbids sexual activity on public property yet permits it on private property.Footnote 65 Many cities ban camping on public property, but individuals can lawfully erect tents in their living rooms.Footnote 66
The State can justifiably prohibit certain acts that take place on public property to preserve its collective value and to safeguard liberty outside of one’s home. In contrast, private property’s role and value are different. Unlike public property, private property is not an open-access space. It does not allow for large-scale interaction between strangers with shared and conflicting interests.Footnote 67 Nor does private property aim to promote certain democratic, communal, and civic values that are integral to the open-access nature of public property.Footnote 68
Private property fulfils a different role. By insulating individuals from public life and forced interactions with others, it protects interests such as liberty, autonomy, privacy, and personhood.Footnote 69 In many senses, private property is a refuge from public property and the public sphere. Public property and private property’s distinct roles – and the different interests that they foster – explain why the State can justifiably prohibit certain acts on public property but not on private property.Footnote 70 There are three reasons for this.
First, certain justifications for prohibiting an act on public property cannot apply to private property.Footnote 71 The State regulates public property to solve coordination problems and increase the efficiency of public ways.Footnote 72 Such justifications underpin laws that prohibit individuals from sitting or camping on sidewalks.Footnote 73 These same justifications could not support a law that regulates how individuals sit or camp within their homes because it is not an open-access space that requires efficiency and cooperation between persons. Instead, rightsholders set the agenda of their private property and can exclude others from it. This preempts coordination problems and mitigates efficiency concerns that justify the prohibition of certain acts of public property.Footnote 74 These examples show how some justifications for proscribing a particular act on public property cannot be transposed to justify proscribing that same act on private property.Footnote 75
Second, the justifications for prohibiting some act on public property diminish or disappear when that same act is done on private property.Footnote 76 The State can regulate sexual acts, defecation, and nudity on public property because it offends others and breaches “norms about public behavior.”Footnote 77 When individuals do these acts in a park, they may force unwilling observers to enter into their private domain.Footnote 78 However, these concerns largely disappear when individuals do these acts in the privacy of their homes.Footnote 79 The same is true for sanitation and public health justifications that underpin municipal ordinances. Cities prohibit public defecation.Footnote 80 Yet individuals can lawfully defecate in bathrooms within their homes – a private space that reduces sanitation concerns and mitigates public health risks. This explains why the State can justifiably prohibit public defecation and urination but can less justifiably proscribe these acts when they are done within one’s home.
Two caveats are necessary here. First, to some extent, the State can justifiably regulate how people alleviate their needs within their homes. To ensure that dwellings are fit for habitation, the State can prohibit defecating and urinating in places within one’s home that are not intended for that purpose.Footnote 81 The State can declare private property unfit for human habitation when it poses a significant health risk to the occupants or to others.Footnote 82 Second, the State may regulate or police certain forms of housing more than others. Public housing, for instance, may be subject to more invasive regulation and policing compared to private housing.Footnote 83 Furthermore, individuals may face more police scrutiny or enjoy less privacy in these spaces.Footnote 84 Leaving aside these circumstances, the justifications for prohibiting certain acts on public property tend to diminish or disappear when people do these same acts on private property.Footnote 85
There is a third reason why the State can more justifiably regulate certain acts that occur on public property versus on private property. On public property, the State’s interests may outweigh individual rights.Footnote 86 Yet on private property, the individual’s rights tend to outweigh the State’s interests.Footnote 87 There may be compelling justifications to prohibit and police some act on private property. However, the individual’s fundamental interests in dignity, privacy, and liberty may take precedence over the State’s interests in prohibiting some conduct that is done on private property.Footnote 88 Recall how private property rights strongly protect certain individual interests and confer one of the highest expectations of privacy.Footnote 89 If the State attempts to police how individuals alleviate their needs within their homes, the State will unjustifiably impact these interests. Private property rights limit the State’s power to prohibit and police need-alleviating acts that are done within one’s home.Footnote 90
Nonegalitarian regulation constitutes a form of domination for various reasons. For one, the State enjoys a unilateral and largely uncontrolled power to enact laws that interfere with unhoused persons’ most basic interests in ways that do not affect others. Furthermore, the nonegalitarian regulation of unhoused persons subjects them to the two types of domination discussed in the previous chapter: others’ control over unhoused persons’ law-abidingness and nonegalitarian trade-offs. And as discussed further in Section 5.5, nonegalitarian regulation results in disparate enforcement actions against unhoused persons that exemplify domination, and that can entrench individuals in the condition of homelessness.
5.4.2 Privacy-Dependent Laws and Homelessness
Nonegalitarian regulation shapes how laws that govern public property operate differently for unhoused persons. Many municipal ordinances operate like typical criminal law prohibitions for people with access to housing, but they impose the equivalent of affirmative duties to act on people experiencing homelessness.Footnote 91 Although unhoused persons have a positive duty to secure access to a private place to alleviate their needs, others exert control over whether unhoused persons can fulfil that duty – a form of domination introduced in the previous chapter.Footnote 92 In contrast, people with private property rights have free access to a default private place where they can engage in their most basic human acts. They generally do not have an affirmative duty to secure access to a private place where they can do these acts and obey laws that govern public property.Footnote 93 Instead, they must abstain from alleviating their needs in public property because they have free access to a lawful alternative.Footnote 94
To illustrate this point, notice how some municipal ordinances operate differently than typical crimes. Laws that govern public property constitute privacy-dependent laws. The term “privacy-dependent law” implies that a statute proscribes a particular act on public property but permits that same act when it is done in private. Examples of privacy-dependent laws include statutes that prohibit urban camping, public urination, and loitering.
Privacy-dependent laws result in nonegalitarian regulation because they operate more like crimes of omission for unhoused persons and as crimes of commission for people with access to housing.Footnote 95 The distinction between these two categories of crimes is as follows. Crimes of commission are committed by positive acts.Footnote 96 The term “positive act” refers to actions, interventions, or affirmative conduct that worsens another’s situation or sets back their interests.Footnote 97 The majority of crimes are crimes of commission. Typical examples include proscriptions against acts such as assault, theft, fraud, murder, arson, mischief, and so on. Individuals obey these laws when they abstain from the unlawful positive act.Footnote 98 Admittedly, it may be difficult for some people to refrain from certain conduct, especially where the conduct is compelled by addiction or irresistible impulses.Footnote 99 Most people, however, can abstain from committing the proscribed act to obey the law.
Laws that criminalize omissions are different. The term “omission” implies that an individual fails to fulfil an affirmative duty to act that is imposed by the law.Footnote 100 In the context of omissions liability, an individual is culpable because they failed to do a certain act that was required by law; their nonintervention is what makes their conduct morally blameworthy. Examples of affirmative duties to act include parents’ positive obligations to feed and clothe their children, the affirmative duty to file a tax return, and the affirmative duty to stop at the scene of an accident that one causes.Footnote 101
Crimes of omission tend to limit freedom more considerably than crimes of commission.Footnote 102 Crimes of omission require the individual to fulfil an affirmative duty to act but prohibit all other conduct, whereas crimes of commission proscribe a single act but permit the individual to engage in other actions.Footnote 103
The combination of two factors explain why laws that regulate public property impose the equivalent of affirmative duties to act on unhoused persons but not on people with access to housing.Footnote 104 First, like in the context of omissions liability, individuals who must alleviate their needs cannot engage in alternate courses of action.Footnote 105 As part of the human experience, everyone must sleep, urinate, defecate, and so on.Footnote 106 When an individual must alleviate their needs as a matter of biological necessity – for instance, when they must sleep or defecate – they must do so to the exclusion of all other acts.
Second, since laws that regulate public property require individuals to alleviate their needs in private, individuals have a positive duty to secure access to a private space to obey these laws.Footnote 107 While the biological requirement to alleviate one’s needs limits the range of alternate courses of action, the prohibition against alleviating one’s needs on public property imposes a positive duty to secure access to a private space to comply with the law.Footnote 108
Some privacy-dependent laws limit freedom more than others. Consider the difference between indecency laws that prohibit sexual activity on public property versus laws that proscribe sleeping or urination on public property. Indecency laws require individuals to engage in sexual activity in private. Since individuals retain the choice of whether to engage in sexual activity, they maintain the freedom to comply with indecency laws through abstention.
Statutes that proscribe sleeping or urinating on public property restrict liberty and free choice more severely. Unlike other criminal laws, a person’s opportunity to obey privacy-dependent laws hinges on their opportunity to access a private space to alleviate their biologically necessary needs.Footnote 109 Since others exert control over unhoused persons’ access to private property, others also exert control over whether they fulfil their positive duty to alleviate their needs in private and, ultimately, obey the law.Footnote 110
In contrast, for people with access to housing, privacy-dependent laws function more like typical crimes of commission that proscribe positive acts. Although biological necessity requires people with access to housing to alleviate their needs to the exclusion of all other acts, they have free access to a default private place where they can shelter themselves, sleep, and urinate.Footnote 111 Access to housing helps ensure that individuals are not constantly burdened with an affirmative duty to secure access to a private place to obey laws that govern public property. This explains why these laws subject unhoused persons to affirmative duties to act more frequently than people with access to housing.
To be clear, this does not mean that people with access to housing are never subject to the affirmative duty to act described above. Individuals who leave their homes must urinate, defecate, or rest, and they must still obtain permission to enter a private place to do so. Yet in comparison to unhoused persons, people with access to housing are imposed this duty far less regularly and consistently. This is especially true with respect to certain need-alleviating conduct that people with access to housing routinely do without having to secure access to a private space, such as sleeping and sheltering themselves.
Private property rights – and one’s freedom to access private property – thus shape whether laws that govern public property operate more like crimes of omission versus crimes of commission. Access to housing influences whether laws that govern public property constantly subject individuals to affirmative duties to act, and whether others exert control over whether they fulfil that duty.
5.5 Nonegalitarian Enforcement
The second aspect of nonegalitarian coercion is nonegalitarian enforcement, meaning that officers have more discretionary power to police unhoused persons than people with access to housing – a form of vertical domination. Police discretion can result in domination for several reasons. Police discretion can be exercised arbitrarily and without adequate checks and balances.Footnote 112 Law enforcement interactions tend to be low-visibility, and many exercises of police discretion are never reviewed by courts.Footnote 113 Officers may also single out marginalized persons who lack sufficient political power, legal knowledge, or finances to contest such mistreatment.Footnote 114 There may be so many applicable laws that individuals will inevitably violate one of them, such that officers enjoy vast enforcement discretion.Footnote 115 Officers, in turn, enjoy the power to unilaterally interfere at will with individuals who break these laws. Officers may also abuse their authority and denigrate or humiliate members of the public.Footnote 116
Police discretion has various other characteristics that are associated with domination. Police officers and individuals are in an asymmetrical power dynamic vis-à-vis one another; a dynamic that is known to officers and individuals, and that shapes how law enforcement encounters unfold.Footnote 117 Furthermore, officers can exercise public powers that private individuals lack. The police have the power to issue fines, confiscate property, incarcerate persons, arrest people in contexts where individuals have no such authority, and charge persons with crimes and regulatory offenses.Footnote 118
Nonegalitarian enforcement subjects people experiencing homelessness to vertical domination for three principal reasons. First, since unhoused persons must spend much of their time on public property where privacy-dependent laws are enforced, they are frequently subject to uncontrolled police discretion associated with these laws.Footnote 119 Without access to housing, unhoused persons are constantly at risk of violating laws that govern public property and facing coercion and punishment by the police.Footnote 120 People with access to housing, on the other hand, can freely alleviate their needs within their homes – the very spaces where privacy-dependent laws do not apply and are not enforced by the police.Footnote 121 Housing shields individuals against the discretionary enforcement of laws that govern public property.Footnote 122
Second, unhoused persons are vulnerable to vertical domination because they lack physical and legal protection against police discretion. The police cannot freely access an individual’s home because of the significant legal protections that private property rights afford against State intrusion.Footnote 123 Save for exigent circumstances, officers require warrants to enter someone’s home or access its perimeter.Footnote 124 People experiencing homelessness lack this protection.Footnote 125 The police patrol public places, which is where unhoused persons tend to spend their time and alleviate their needs when they lack alternatives. As a result, people experiencing homelessness are vulnerable to disproportionate levels of surveillance, law enforcement encounters, and police discretion.Footnote 126
Third, police officers may exercise their discretion abusively and arbitrarily against unhoused persons. In survey studies, people experiencing homelessness report that they have been fined, arrested, or harassed by the police even though they did not violate any laws. For instance, in 2009, Bill O’Grady and colleagues conducted an empirical study comprised of survey questions and semi-structured interviews that involved 244 unhoused youth aged 16–24 in the city of Toronto.Footnote 127 One-third of the respondents who received a fine contended that they had committed no offense and that the sanction was unfair.Footnote 128 The National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty conducted a similar survey that involved ninety unhoused adults in New York City.Footnote 129 Roughly 60 percent of the participants indicated that they experienced harassment by the police.Footnote 130 A 2014 survey study questioned 441 people experiencing homelessness in Colorado.Footnote 131 Approximately 76 percent of respondents indicated that they were harassed by the police despite having done nothing wrong.Footnote 132 Beyond harassment, citations, and arrests, many unhoused persons report that police officers confiscate or destroy their property without legal authorization or prior warning.Footnote 133 Certain judicial decisions support these findings.Footnote 134
Furthermore, in certain studies, unhoused persons report that they were singled-out by the police because they were experiencing homelessness. In the Colorado study discussed above, nearly 86 percent of respondents stated that the police targeted them for that reason.Footnote 135 In O’Grady and colleagues’ study of unhoused youth in Toronto, many respondents reported that they were fined for an offense that the police do not enforce against others, such as jaywalking.Footnote 136 A study conducted by the Quebec Human Rights Commission concluded that unhoused persons are socially profiled and frequently receive fines for committing offenses that were rarely enforced against others, such as lying across a park bench rather than sitting at it.Footnote 137 These examples illustrate how unhoused persons are vulnerable to the prospect of unilateral interference by the police, and to the nonegalitarian enforcement of laws that govern public property.
5.6 Conclusion
This chapter demonstrated why the State has more power to regulate and police unhoused persons compared to people with access to housing. It showed why the State can more justifiably regulate and control certain acts that occur on public property than on private property. It explained why unhoused persons experience two forms of nonegalitarian coercion that produce domination: nonegalitarian regulation and nonegalitarian enforcement. And it elucidated how nonegalitarian coercion constitutes a unique form of domination that affects people experiencing homelessness. More specifically, nonegalitarian coercion subjects unhoused persons’ law abidingness to others’ control, requires them to make nonegalitarian trade-offs to obey the law, and contributes to discriminatory policing practices. The next chapter explores the notion of punitive entrenchment. It elucidates how and why the State can entrench individuals in the condition of homelessness, such that they experience nonegalitarian coercion and its accompanying forms of domination.
