In this book, I’ve developed a framework for analysing different relations with technical artefacts that have a hand in harm. In doing so, I’ve argued that harms implicating technologies cannot be described solely through a ‘physicalistic vocabulary’ (Heyndels, 2023: 10). We cannot reduce artefacts to their physical properties and examine their causal powers without recourse to notions of value, intention and function. Examining the physical impact of technologies exercising one or more of their causal powers is, of course, one dimension that we must describe if we are to properly account for the roles technologies play in harm. But it is just one dimension, and without turning to an intentional vocabulary of values, intentions and technical functions, we’re left with little sense of how many of these causal powers come to be exercised. Moreover, as technical artefacts are intentionally designed objects, we need to interrogate the nexus between an artefact, its designers’ intentions and beliefs, and the harms it has a hand in. Once again, without an intentional vocabulary we are adrift. We are unable to undertake a crucial normative assessment of whether an artefact was functioning as its creators intended when it contributed to a social harm. Unlike natural objects, technical artefacts are developed for a particular purpose and, consequently, their performance can be subject to normative judgements (Franssen, 2006). As Heyndels (2023: 11) emphasizes: ‘A hammer or car can malfunction: it makes sense to distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ hammers or cars. In so far as normative descriptions cannot be reduced to physical descriptions, functional descriptions are necessary to capturing this aspect of technological artifacts.’

Whether or not a technology can be said to be functioning well according to its designers isn't just a matter of whether it malfunctions or functions ‘correctly’.