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2 - Corporate Governance and State

from Part I - Theory and Framework

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 December 2025

Zenichi Shishido
Affiliation:
Musashino University, Tokyo
Wei Shen
Affiliation:
Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China
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Summary

Chapter 2 provides the image of the incentive bargaining of the firm with the state (or government) as the fifth player in the three countries. Section 2.1 compares the industrial policy, which is a typical measure for the state to directly affect the incentives of management, of the three countries. Historically, all three countries have extensively used industrial policy to stimulate industries from a macro perspective and motivate the management of individual firms to take risks. Section 2.2 compares the three different incentive mechanisms of the firm, including the state. The incentive mechanism of the US firms can be expressed as a monitoring image incentive pattern, or the principal-agent model. The incentive mechanism of Japanese firms can be expressed as a bargaining image incentive pattern, or the company community model. The incentive mechanism of Chinese SOEs can be expressed as a party-state model. The incentive mechanism of Chinese POEs can be expressed as an owner management model.

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  • Corporate Governance and State
  • Zenichi Shishido, Musashino University, Tokyo, Wei Shen, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China
  • Book: Incentive Bargaining and Corporate Governance
  • Online publication: 12 December 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009152808.005
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  • Corporate Governance and State
  • Zenichi Shishido, Musashino University, Tokyo, Wei Shen, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China
  • Book: Incentive Bargaining and Corporate Governance
  • Online publication: 12 December 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009152808.005
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Corporate Governance and State
  • Zenichi Shishido, Musashino University, Tokyo, Wei Shen, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China
  • Book: Incentive Bargaining and Corporate Governance
  • Online publication: 12 December 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009152808.005
Available formats
×