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1 - The Framework of Analysis

from Part I - Theory and Framework

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 December 2025

Zenichi Shishido
Affiliation:
Musashino University, Tokyo
Wei Shen
Affiliation:
Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China
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Summary

One of the key concepts of this book is “incentive bargaining.” We view the firm as an ongoing joint project, which requires both monetary and human capital. There are two main groups of indispensable capital providers to the joint project: (1) management and employees as the human capital providers; and (2) shareholders and creditors as the monetary capital providers. These two groups need to motivate other capital providers to provide their capital to maximize their own payoff. The bargaining among the indispensable capital providers that motivates each player to provide its capital to the joint project will be called “incentive bargaining.” Incentive bargaining among the four players in a stock corporation is made not as a multilateral bargaining but as a complex of three bilateral bargaining processes via management. The way of incentive bargaining, or incentive pattern, in each country can be categorized into either the balancing image, the monitoring image, or the bargaining image, based on the way of coalition among the four players.

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  • The Framework of Analysis
  • Zenichi Shishido, Musashino University, Tokyo, Wei Shen, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China
  • Book: Incentive Bargaining and Corporate Governance
  • Online publication: 12 December 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009152808.004
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  • The Framework of Analysis
  • Zenichi Shishido, Musashino University, Tokyo, Wei Shen, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China
  • Book: Incentive Bargaining and Corporate Governance
  • Online publication: 12 December 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009152808.004
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • The Framework of Analysis
  • Zenichi Shishido, Musashino University, Tokyo, Wei Shen, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China
  • Book: Incentive Bargaining and Corporate Governance
  • Online publication: 12 December 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009152808.004
Available formats
×