Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-z4zkx Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-18T01:35:26.321Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Chapter 9 - Perception and Disjunctivism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 November 2025

Frode Kjosavik
Affiliation:
Norwegian University of Life Sciences
Get access

Summary

Disjunctivism is a much debated topic within present-day philosophy of perception. The pressing issue here is whether there is a fundamental difference in kind between perceptions and hallucinations. If a perception could counterfactually have been a hallucination with the same content, one can hardly claim that perceptions and hallucinations are fundamentally different in kind qua representational states. What determines whether a representation is a perception or a hallucination is then not what the mind is like but rather what the external world is like. However, singular marks in perception have double existence – both “intentional” existence in the perceptions themselves and “natural” existence in the perceived scene. Perceptions also come with possible perspectival transformations ad indefinitum, due to their informational link to their objects. On this basis, a disjunctivist position is ascribed to Kant. It is also argued that perceptions, unlike hallucinations, come with their own epistemic warrants, be it in humans or in non-rational animals.

Information

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Book purchase

Temporarily unavailable

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

  • Perception and Disjunctivism
  • Frode Kjosavik, Norwegian University of Life Sciences
  • Book: Kant and the Power of Perception
  • Online publication: 27 November 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009596213.011
Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

  • Perception and Disjunctivism
  • Frode Kjosavik, Norwegian University of Life Sciences
  • Book: Kant and the Power of Perception
  • Online publication: 27 November 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009596213.011
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Perception and Disjunctivism
  • Frode Kjosavik, Norwegian University of Life Sciences
  • Book: Kant and the Power of Perception
  • Online publication: 27 November 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009596213.011
Available formats
×