Chapter 2 examines Kant’s distinction between free and adherent beauty and its implications for artistic beauty. This distinction is controversial because adherent beauty, which presupposes a concept of what the object ought to be, seems at odds with Kant’s demand that judgments of taste be concept-free. These tensions, heightened by his remarks on fine art and genius, have led some to doubt whether artistic beauty qualifies as beauty. The chapter reviews major interpretations – Crawford’s abstraction account, the incorporation view, and the conjunctive view. While Crawford seeks purity through abstraction, the other views show how judgments of perfection can inform aesthetic appreciation without reducing it to rule-governed evaluation. These approaches, rather than rivals, are complementary and reveal the flexibility of Kant’s framework. The chapter concludes that treating artistic beauty as a form of adherent beauty allows for informed, though impure, judgments of taste. These judgments allow descriptive and contextual considerations to guide critical evaluation while preserving Kant’s core commitments.