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2 - A Theory of Informality and the Weak-State Trap

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  aN Invalid Date NaN

Jessica Gottlieb
Affiliation:
University of Houston
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Summary

The theory posits an indirect negative consequence of informality on economic development. I first identify the type of informality that will have this effect and then argue that embedded informality slows the development of state capacity, mediated by politics. Two distinct accountability-capacity equilibria – a non-programmatic, weak state and a programmatic, strong state – support this logic. When given the choice, voters in a weak state will discipline politicians along particularistic rather than programmatic criteria, but only the latter generates incentives for politicians to invest in state capacity. In non-programmatic elections, informality instead creates incentives not to invest in the state or even quash such investments, keeping the state weak. First, large-scale economic informality reduces expectations that the state can deliver on programmatic promises and the likelihood that a majority of voters will coordinate around programmatic claims. Second, a constituency opposed to state-building is more likely to form where contact with the state is frequently facilitated by intermediaries who benefit from their role in discretionary politics.

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