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2 - Adam Smith on Resentment and Retribution

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 October 2026

Michael Demson
Affiliation:
Sam Houston State University
Regina Hewitt
Affiliation:
University of South Florida
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Summary

Adam Smith has long been aligned with theories of retributive justice, his fundamental view being that injury naturally begets resentment and a desire to punish the person injuring. Smith believed institutions of justice must recognise the validity of this urge to direct it through a process that satisfies the victim and his friends as a matter of right, as well as to prevent excessive retaliation that would undermine the order and tranquility of society. Theorists of punishment often express a fear that retributivism's association with resentment and strict punitive rules will encourage violation of the criminal's human dignity and promote attitudes indifferent to the amount of harm inflicted on the criminal. Recent reinterpretations of Smith's writings have awakened interest in Smith's treatment of justice and invite a more nuanced and complex account of the retribution issue. A significant catalyst is Samuel Fleischacker's Being Me Being You: Adam Smith and Empathy, which constructs a theory of empathy that ‘descends from Smith's account but is not in all respects identical with it’. Taking a more literal approach, this chapter will show how a tempered account of retribution could emerge in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, attending particularly to dilemmas concerning fairness, equality and openness to change within Smith's overall defence of the legal system.

In Smith's views on resentment and retribution, a fundamental part is played by imagination, particularly as a means for human beings to gain understanding of each other.

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