Modals and Conditionals

doi:10.1017/9781108766401.026

17 - Modals and Conditionals

from Part VIII - Implying and (Pre)supposing

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 October 2022

Matthew Mandelkern

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Daniel Altshuler

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Daniel Altshuler: Affiliation:
University of Oxford

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Summary

Modals and conditionals play a starring role in philosophical and linguistic research. The ability to think modally distal thoughts is central to the human capacity to plan and choose; and the ability to express such thoughts is central to the human capacity for collective action. Modals and conditionals have yielded a rich bounty of puzzles about logic, semantics, and pragmatics. I organize this chapter around three topics: the interpretation of epistemic modals, particularly how they interact with their local information; the interpretation of conditionals, with a focus on logical questions; and, finally, practical modality, with discussion of a potentially unified perspective on practical modality as essentially involving reference to actions.

Keywords

modals conditionals epistemic modals logic of conditionals restrictor analysis practical modals ability

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Type: Chapter
Information: Linguistics Meets Philosophy , pp. 502 - 533

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108766401.026 [Opens in a new window]

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Print publication year: 2022

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