Introduction

Essentialism assumes that ‘the attributes and behaviour of socially defined groups can be determined and explained by reference to cultural and/or biological characteristics believed to be inherent to the group’ (Bucholtz, 2003: 400). In some cases, the appeal to essentialism may be strategic (Cowan et al., 2001: 10; McElhinny, 1996), in that group members or advocates acting on their behalf are deliberately treating as stable and clearly defined phenomena that (they are aware) are in fact highly fluid, variable or even conflicting. Bucholtz (2003: 401) suggests that strategic essentialism is typically intended as a short-term measure, although ‘not all participants who commit themselves to an essentialist position necessarily recognize it as a temporary tactic’. In the field of sociolinguistics, Bucholtz offers gender studies and research on African-American Vernacular English as examples of essentializing efforts being (strategically) undertaken by researchers in order to help gain legitimacy for the otherwise devalued language practices of women and African-Americans.

The process of engaging in research is (arguably) particularly conducive to encouraging and even institutionalizing an attitude of critical scrutiny. Consequently, Bucholtz’s suggestion that strategic essentialism, as deployed in research, has a built-in shelf life that mitigates any problems that might arise from a long-term reification and elevation of selected traits or practices and their linkages with particular groups seems plausible enough. The problem is that once we move beyond the boundaries of research, it is not obvious that a clear distinction between strategic and non-strategic essentialism can be maintained, nor is it certain that strategic essentialism can be described as a short-term tactic. This is because the appeal to essentialism tends to intersect with an appeal to cultural rights.

As Cowan et al. (2001: 1) observe, ‘constituting one historically specific way of conceptualizing the relations of entitlement and obligation, the model of rights is today hegemonic, and imbued with an emancipatory aura’.