This chapter argues that Déat and his allies rallied to a politics of collaboration not because of a prior affinity with fascism, but through the vector of pacifism and appeasement. After his marginalization by the Popular Front, Déat re-emerged as a leader of the pacifist camp as the political field became polarized around the question of war. Déat adopted an anti-anti-fascist stance, downplaying his prior opposition to fascism as he forged new alliances with pacifists on both the left and right. It was through the politics of appeasement that Déat and his pacifist allies found themselves favorably disposed to Franco-German collaboration and an authoritarian “national revolution” after France’s defeat. In Vichy, Déat sought unsuccessfully to position himself as a leader of the “national revolution.” This was not a simple continuation of his past neo-socialist commitments but represented an adaptation to the unique conjuncture of Vichy in 1940.