Book contents
- Phenomenology of Emotions
- Phenomenology of Emotions
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Preface
- Emotions and Vulnerability
- Part I Emotions and Human Vulnerability: Phenomenological Intertwinings
- Part II Vulnerability and Psychopathology: Emotions and Their Embodiment
- PART III Overcoming Vulnerabilities in Psychotherapy: Embodied Emotions and Healing
- Chapter 15 Self-Patterns and Affective Atmospheres in Psychiatry
- Chapter 16 Affective Vulnerability and Affective Suffering
- Chapter 17 Emotions and Schizophrenia
- Chapter 18 Digital Deathlessness
- Chapter 19 Transformative Trust
- Chapter 20 Absorbing and Broadcasting
- Chapter 21 Empathy as the Emotional Basis of a Therapeutic Relationship
- Index
- References
Chapter 19 - Transformative Trust
Interpersonal Autonomy, Affectivity, and Vulnerability in Trust and Its Relevance for Psychotherapy
from PART III - Overcoming Vulnerabilities in Psychotherapy: Embodied Emotions and Healing
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 July 2026
Book contents
- Phenomenology of Emotions
- Phenomenology of Emotions
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Preface
- Emotions and Vulnerability
- Part I Emotions and Human Vulnerability: Phenomenological Intertwinings
- Part II Vulnerability and Psychopathology: Emotions and Their Embodiment
- PART III Overcoming Vulnerabilities in Psychotherapy: Embodied Emotions and Healing
- Chapter 15 Self-Patterns and Affective Atmospheres in Psychiatry
- Chapter 16 Affective Vulnerability and Affective Suffering
- Chapter 17 Emotions and Schizophrenia
- Chapter 18 Digital Deathlessness
- Chapter 19 Transformative Trust
- Chapter 20 Absorbing and Broadcasting
- Chapter 21 Empathy as the Emotional Basis of a Therapeutic Relationship
- Index
- References
Summary
This chapter offers a novel account of trust as a form of opening one’s mind to the autonomy of other persons. Despite a long tradition of philosophical thinking about trust, it remains unclear how (non-instrumental) trust works in close human relationships. While important strands of theorising in sociology and moral psychology recognise that trust involves accepted vulnerability, the autonomy of the trusted person is typically viewed as something to be coped with rather than embraced. By drawing on a central distinction in Husserl’s phenomenology, the chapter proposes shifting the perspective and placing the other’s autonomy at the centre of the trusting attitude in close relationships. A personalistic perspective on trust emphasises shared goals and values with the trusted individual, shaping the affective attitude towards them. To understand the affective dynamics involved in sharing and adjusting one’s goals or values in interpersonal trust, the authors suggest conceptualising attitudinal aspects of trust as a metacognitive feeling that entails a self-explorative dimension. The chapter demonstrates how this self-explorative dimension helps explain the dynamics of disclosing intimate details and adopting another’s perspective in psychotherapeutic relationships, or what is referred to as transformative trust.
Keywords
Information
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Phenomenology of EmotionsPerspectives from Philosophy, Psychopathology, and Psychotherapy, pp. 421 - 443Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2026
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