What prompted Arendt’s investigations of moral and legal judgment was the trial of Adolf Eichmann for crimes of the Holocaust. Her controversial view is that Eichmann represented the “banality of evil,” by which she means “the phenomenon of evil deeds, committed on a gigantic scale, which could not be traced to any particularity of wickedness, pathology, or ideological conviction in the doer, whose only personal distinction was a perhaps extraordinary shallowness.” This chapter explains what Arendt means by “banality of evil” and why it led to confusions. It reviews the evidence by which she supported her thesis of Eichmann’s banality. The chapter points out several large and challenging philosophical questions the thesis raises. The chapter’s final section connects her concept of the banality of evil to her reflections on kitsch in aesthetics, as well as to Kant’s “maxims of common human understanding.” Kant’s theory of aesthetic judgment turns out to be central to Arendt’s approach to moral judgment.