Many commentators, including distinguished historians, think that Arendt got Eichmann completely wrong – far from being banal, he was a fanatical Nazi. This chapter addresses those criticisms. It argues that if the critics are right, it would damage some but not all of Arendt’s conclusions. It shows that three of the four most important criticisms rest on misreadings or mistakes. The fourth, argued by Eichmann scholar Bettina Stangneth, is that evidence unavailable to Arendt when she wrote proves that she was wrong about Eichmann. The chapter closely examines Stangneth’s arguments, and it defends Arendt’s banality conjecture as an equally plausible interpretation of Stangneth’s historical discoveries. It concludes by explaining how the banality-of-evil thesis sets the agenda for Arendt’s subsequent writing on moral philosophy and legal theory.