This chapter is the first of three on Arendt’s moral philosophy, which focuses on moral judgment and its connection to thinking from another’s point of view. Arendt draws central ideas about morality from Kant’s theory of aesthetic judgment – not because morality is an aesthetic matter, but because logical features Kant identified in aesthetic judgments are properties of moral judgments as well. Kant argued that judgments of beauty are objective, even though they cannot be proven; that they concern particulars, without relying on general rules, what Arendt calls “banisters”; and that we form moral judgments in common with others. Arendt maintains that the same is true of moral and political judgments. However, she also believes that “the invocation of allegedly moral principles for matters of everyday conduct is usually a fraud”; morality matters only “in times of crises.” This chapter disagrees, and argues that moral judgments “without banisters” matter throughout our moral life.