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16 - Bureaucracy

from Part III - Public choice in a representative democracy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Dennis C. Mueller
Affiliation:
Universität Wien, Austria
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Summary

There can be no doubt, that if power is granted to a body of men, called representatives, they, like any other men, will use their power, not for the advantage of the community, but for their own advantage, if they can.

James Mill

Each official is evidently more active within the body to which he belongs than each citizen within that to which he belongs. The government's actions are accordingly influenced by the private wills of its members much more than the sovereign's [citizenry's] by those of its members – if only because the official is almost always individually responsible for any specific function of sovereignty. (Italics in original)

Jean-Jacques Rousseau

The preceding chapters have focused upon the demand side of public choice. The citizen voter's preferences determine outcomes in the public sector. Government, like the market in a pure exchange economy, is viewed simply as an institution for aggregating or balancing individual demands for public policies. Those in government, the candidates and representatives, have been depicted as single-mindedly seeking to be elected. To do so they must please voters, so that those in government are merely pawns of those outside in a competitive political system. Only in the rent-seeking literature just reviewed does one begin to obtain a glimpse of another side of government. Politicians may not live by votes alone. They, too, may seek wealth and leisure. Their preferences may impinge on the outcomes of the public sector.

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  • Bureaucracy
  • Dennis C. Mueller, Universität Wien, Austria
  • Book: Public Choice III
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511813771.017
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  • Bureaucracy
  • Dennis C. Mueller, Universität Wien, Austria
  • Book: Public Choice III
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511813771.017
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Bureaucracy
  • Dennis C. Mueller, Universität Wien, Austria
  • Book: Public Choice III
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511813771.017
Available formats
×