Plato’s notion of pathos, owing to its highly generic nature, has never been the focus of dedicated scholarly investigation. In fact, within Plato’s dialogues, pathos encompasses an exceptionally broad range of meanings – virtually covering the entire semantic spectrum of the term and largely mirroring its usage in everyday language. Meanings that would later become standard – such as pathos as an affection of the soul or a qualitative modification – represent only some of its possible applications. Moreover, pathos, as a concept in its own right, is never explicitly defined or systematically examined by Plato. Even within the collection of Platonic horoi, no canonical definition of the term is to be found. This lack of formal treatment, however, does not imply that Plato was uninterested in the concept. On the contrary, alongside the common meanings, more specific – if not outright technical – uses of the term appear in the dialogues. Certain meanings of pathos, which emerge for the first time in Plato and are closely tied to his philosophical project, suggest a significant degree of conceptual elaboration. One such case is the ontological understanding of pathos – as a predicate that does not express the essence (ousia) of a thing, but only an accidental attribute. This ontological sense becomes particularly salient in two dialogues likely belonging to Plato’s early period, Euthyphro and Hippias Major, where pathos is presented in contrast to ousia within the framework of the Socratic inquiry into the ti esti.
A comprehensive account of all the meanings of pathos in Plato is beyond the scope of this discussion. It will suffice here to note that pathos in Plato’s lexicon refers to a remarkably broad spectrum of phenomena, ranging from bodily affectionsFootnote 1 to external events,Footnote 2 from the cognitive states of the rational soulFootnote 3 to the passions that will later be codified in Hellenistic philosophy. It also encompasses all movements of the will, all forms of desire, and the processes or modifications that give rise to these passions.Footnote 4 Beyond the specific domain of the soul, pathos denotes movement and change in all its forms, both substantial and qualitative.Footnote 5 Virtually everything associated with the world of genesis, with becoming in any form, can be described as pathos, since the realm of genesis is, for Plato, the domain of pathos and paschein par excellence.
It thus becomes evident why pathos is immediately linked to what, in Plato’s metaphysics, possesses a lower degree of ontological value. Given that the opposition between genesis and ousia constitutes one of the fundamental polarities in his thought, the relationship between pathos – which characterizes the sphere of genesis – and ousia is particularly significant. In what follows, I will examine this relationship as it is developed in the Euthyphro and Hippias Major, where Plato explicitly sets pathos in contrast with ousia.
2.1 Euthyphro
The second real definition of the hosion – the ‘holy’ – proposed in the Euthyphro is that which ‘all the gods love’ (ὅ ἂν πάντες οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶσιν, 9e1–2). After refuting this definition, Socrates notes that being loved by the gods is a pathos of the holy, rather than its ousia (11a6–b1). While the logical structure of Socrates’ argument has been the subject of extensive analytical scrutiny,Footnote 6 it is worthwhile here to consider certain aspects of the passage that shed light specifically on the conception of pathos.
At first glance, the logical progression of the argument may not appear crucial for understanding what Socrates means by pathos. He explicitly states that the pathos of the hosion consists in being loved (phileisthai) by the gods. This characterization, as noted by scholars focused on the logic of the argument, appears to be simply appended to the preceding discussion.Footnote 7 However, the actual development of the passage seems to offer additional insights into the notion of pathos, which merit closer attention – especially in light of its complexity. For this reason, it is useful to recall the main stages of the argument.
Socrates first poses the dilemma (10a2–3): Is something holy because it is loved by the gods, or is it loved because it is holy? Euthyphro, however, fails to grasp the distinction between the two alternatives. Socrates then introduces a contrast between a series of active and corresponding middle-passive participles (φέρον–φερόμενον, ἄγον–ἀγόμενον, ὁρῶν–ὁρώμενον, φιλοῦν–φιλούμενον). Subsequently, he employs an inductive argument, this time contrasting middle-passive participles with third-person present indicative forms. From this comparison, Socrates draws a (not fully explicated) causal relationship, whereby the indicative verb accounts for the participle, but not vice versa (φερόμενον ὅτι φέρεται, ‘in the state of being carried because it is carried,’ and not φέρεται ὅτι φερόμενον, ‘carried because it is in a state of being carried’; cf. Jowett’s translation).
Socrates then extends this structure by including gignesthai and paschein alongside verbs such as ‘to see,’ ‘to move/bring,’ and ‘to lead,’ establishing similar causal relations between gignetai and ginomenon, paschei and paschon. By analogy, it follows that the same logic applies to what is loved: something ‘is in a state of being loved because it is loved’ (φιλούμενον ὅτι φιλεῖται). What the gods love – that is, the philoumenon – may then be characterized as theophiles, ‘dear to the gods.’ According to the conclusion of the inductive reasoning, ‘something is beloved because it is loved,’ but not the other way around (φιλούμενον ὅτι φιλεῖται, and not φιλεῖται ὅτι φιλούμενον). Therefore, we must accept that:
(a) ‘Something is dear to the gods because it is loved’ (θεοφιλὲς ὅτι φιλεῖται).
Moreover, based on a proposition that Euthyphro had previously accepted rather unproblematically,
(b) ‘The holy is loved because it is holy’ (τὸ ὅσιον φιλεῖται ὅτι ὅσιον).Footnote 8
Now, if the hosion were identical (tauton, 10e9) with the theophiles, it would be possible to substitute one term for the other.Footnote 9 This would yield the following reformulation of statement (b): ‘What is dear to the gods is loved because it is dear to the gods’ (θεοφιλὲς φιλεῖται ὅτι θεοφιλές), a proposition that is, by the interlocutors’ own admission, incompatible with statement (a), which was the result of the epagōgē. In (a), substitution would lead to the conclusion that ‘something is holy because it is loved’ (ὅσιον ὅτι φιλεῖται), a claim that directly contradicts (b), which had been assumed to be true. Therefore, it follows that hosion and theophiles are not identical.
At this point, Socrates ironically reproaches Euthyphro for having failed to reveal the ousia of the holy, offering instead only a pathos ‘pertaining to it’ (περὶ αὐτοῦ, 11a8). This pathos, as Socrates immediately clarifies, is what the holy has undergone (πέπονθε): namely, its being loved by the gods.
As previously noted, certain elements of this argument provide valuable indications regarding the notion of pathos. Particularly revealing are the examples introduced by Plato during the epagōgē. In addition to the verbs initially employed (φέρεσθαι–ἄγεσθαι–ὁράσθαι, and eventually φιλεῖσθαι), Socrates later introduces gignesthai and paschein. These verbs are not presented merely as further examples but as cases meant to elucidate the meaning of the earlier contrast between participles and middle-passive indicative forms. Indeed, Socrates remarks that the point should now be ‘clear’ (katadēlon).
As frequently occurs in the dialogues, however, Socrates’ purported clarifications actually introduce further complexities. The verbs gignesthai and paschein could not have been included in the initial contrast, since the active vs. middle-passive participial distinction that structured the earlier argument does not apply in their case.Footnote 10 Consequently, the supposed clarification merely reiterates the structure of the earlier examples: the indicative form is said to account for the participle (γιγνόμενον because γίγνεται, πάσχον because πάσχει), but not the reverse.Footnote 11 The priority of the indicative over the participle is thus simply restated, without resolving the underlying conceptual difficulty.
In fact, rather than clarifying the issue, the argument seems to become more complex. Previously, the discussion centered on transitive verbs, where transitivity played a crucial role in establishing the relationship between agent and patient. Now, however, Socrates introduces intransitive verbs.Footnote 12 The explanatory function attributed to these new verbs appears to rely on their presumed capacity to generalize the preceding cases – that is, to make explicit the meaning of what has been said by synthesizing and extending it to all possible instances. In other words, they are intended to facilitate the transition from the initial epagōgē to a deductive inference, whereby the validity of the rule is extended to the case of the philoumenon. Indeed, it is stated immediately afterward that the philoumenon will fall under either paschein or gignesthai.
Yet the introduction of gignesthai remains somewhat opaque. It is not entirely clear why this verb is included or in what precise sense it is supposed to function as a generalization of the earlier examples.Footnote 13 Admittedly, gignesthai can be understood in a passive sense, as ‘being generated’ or ‘being produced,’Footnote 14 which would render it analogous to the previous cases. Like paschein, it can be opposed to the active verb poiein. The situation is more straightforward in the case of paschein. The examples given by Socrates are all intended to illustrate instances of paschein, and hence of pathē: something undergoes a pathos when it is affected by the action of another.
From these examples, one may infer that pathos does not necessarily entail any alteration or modification of the object’s state or nature. Verbs such as pheresthai and agesthai clearly imply a change in the condition of the object being moved. However, others, like horasthai and phileisthai, do not, as such, suggest any transformation or alteration in the object itself.Footnote 15 In this context, pathos assumes a meaning closer to that of the grammatical passive voice,Footnote 16 rather than to the later philosophical sense of pathos as a ‘passion’ involving qualitative change (alloiōsis). A particularly telling example is found in the Lysis (212b), where the pathos of the lover is described in terms of being hated (miseisthai) or not being loved in return (mē antiphileisthai), while the state of being in love – which more properly corresponds to a passion of the soul in the conventional sense – is expressed by a verb in the active diathesis (philein).Footnote 17
This observation leads to an important further implication: insofar as something can be the object of an action, the entity whose ousiaFootnote 18 is under investigation is necessarily subject to paschein and pathos.Footnote 19 The holy undergoes a pathos insofar as it is loved, but this pathos cannot entail any modification of its ousia. In fact, in the specific case of the holy, it is essential – especially from Plato’s perspective – that its nature, its ousia, remain unaffected by the fact that it is loved by someone.Footnote 20 The being of what is affected is thus presupposed by the action of those who love the hosion. The crux of Plato’s argument, then, is that pathos, as it refers to an event or occurrence – something that involves both acting and being acted upon, a poiēma and a pathosFootnote 21 – belongs to the domain of genesis, and as such, cannot constitute the ousia of a thing. This is because it presupposes the existence (along with its essential predicates) of the object being acted upon.Footnote 22 The gods’ act of loving the hosion presupposes that the hosion already subsists independently; it is something that already exists prior to the action.
In the specific context of the Euthyphro, pathos takes on yet another possible meaning. It may function as a predicate that satisfies the conditions of truth and universality, or even necessity. Although Plato does not explicitly state – totidem verbis – in the dialogues that the gods always and necessarily love what is holy, such a conclusion may be drawn from comparison with numerous other passages. It is often affirmed that the divine, being good and just, necessarily loves that which is akin to itself.Footnote 23 Thus, it is always true that the hosion is loved by the gods, whereas to suggest that the gods might love the unjust or engage in unjust actions would be, for Plato, impious. This predicate of the hosion (theophiles) is therefore true, yet it cannot, as we have seen, constitute its ousia. It is an accidental predicate – not because it might fail to apply, but because it is not part of the logos of the ousia.Footnote 24 Nevertheless, pathos can still represent a significant characteristic of the thing in question, especially insofar as it helps establish that the hosion is always loved by the gods.
2.2 Hippias Major
An opposition between pathos and ousia reappears in the Hippias Major, in the context of a definition – offered by Socrates himself, though presented as opinio communis – according to which the beautiful (kalon) is ‘that which is pleasant through hearing and sight’ (τὸ δι’ ἀκοῆς καὶ δι’ ὄψεως ἡδύ, 298a6–7), or alternatively, ‘that part of the pleasant which occurs for sight and hearing’ (τὸ μέρος τοῦ ἡδέος, τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ ὄψει τε καὶ ἀκοῇ γιγνόμενον, 299b3–4). It is worth reviewing the key points of Socrates’ refutation of this definition, with particular attention to the notions of pathos and ousia.
Socrates notes that the definition cannot apply to each of the two pleasures taken individually: neither is, in itself, ‘pleasant through hearing and sight’ (299c). However, the term kalon should apply to each of them separately – what is pleasant for hearing and what is pleasant for sight – as well as to the two taken together. What, then, is the common feature (koinon, 300a10) in virtue of which we call both beautiful? It cannot be their occurrence through sight or hearing, since this attribute would belong to one, but not the other. Nor can the common feature be that they are simply pleasures, since that would entail that beautiful is predicated of all pleasures – a result excluded by the definition as stated. Rather, what is sought must be something both common to the two and ‘specific to each’ (ἑκατέρᾳ ἰδίᾳ). Thus, it cannot be a pathēma (305b5) by which both are affected (πεπόνθασιν, 300b4), but not each one of them individually. At this point, Hippias expresses skepticism, asserting that he cannot conceive of a situation in which two pleasures are jointly affected by a pathos that does not affect each individually. Socrates, however, insists on the logical possibility that two subjects may share an affection that neither experiences separately.
In support of his position, Hippias attempts to demonstrate the impossibility of such a scenario by offering examples of predicates that individuals and pairs share, and vice versa. He himself introduces the pair pathos–ousia (301b8), stating that the impossibility in question concerns either pathos or ousia (ἢ πάθος ἢ οὐσίαν). Socrates then makes an example based on the concepts of ‘one’ and ‘two’: each of them – Socrates and Hippias – undergoes the pathos (πέπονθε, 302a2) of being ‘one,’ and therefore ‘odd,’ but together they constitute ‘two,’ and thus are ‘even.’ Taken individually, neither is ‘two’ or ‘even.’
Socrates, however, reminds Hippias that whatever made the pleasures beautiful had to be something that is predicated of both considered jointly and each considered individually, rather than something that is predicated of both but not of each, or of each but not of both. That is, the subject to which the predicate ‘beautiful’ is to apply must be such in virtue of an ousia common to both (ἀμφότερα, 302c5). At this point, the earlier argument is repeated and expanded: what is both common to the two and specific to each? The answer would seem to be: being a pleasure. However, this cannot be accepted, for it would imply that all pleasures are beautiful. What was instead shared was the pathos of coming into being through sight and hearing (302e3–6). Yet this attribute applies only to the pleasures considered jointly, not to each separately. Taken together, then, they are beautiful; considered individually, they are not. However, the kalon must be predicable of both the group and each member of the group. For it would be absurd to maintain that the beautiful can be predicated of two things separately, but not collectively – or vice versa. The proposed definition must therefore be rejected, since it leads to the conclusion that the two are beautiful together, but not each in itself.
The central role played by the notions of pathos and ousia in this argument is immediately evident, and it raises the question of whether their usage here is consistent with Plato’s employment of these terms in the Euthyphro and elsewhere in the dialogues.
It is noteworthy that the very concepts under scrutiny have historically contributed to scholarly doubts regarding the authenticity of the Hippias Major. Max Pohlenz, for example, argued that ousia and pathos are employed in this dialogue with meanings that appear for the first time only in Aristotle – namely, ousia as determinate substance and pathos as accidental attribute.Footnote 25 On this basis, Pohlenz emphasized the contrast between phileisthai understood as pathos in the Euthyphro and the pathos of being ‘one’ and ‘odd’ in the Hippias Major. In his view, no analogous usage occurs in Plato’s authentic works, whereas clear parallels can be found in Aristotle’s Metaphysics (see N 2, 1088a17 ff., where ‘even’ and ‘odd’ are classified as pathē of numbers).
Αnother proponent of the dialogue’s athetēsis, Dorothy Tarrant, also considered the argumentation obscure and therefore uncharacteristic of Plato’s style and method.Footnote 26 As an example of such obscurity, Tarrant cites 302e6, where Socrates, while discussing what belongs to both hearing and sight, substitutes pathos for ousia, which had been mentioned earlier at 302c5, without any apparent explanation.
Paul Friedländer also observed a similar lack of distinction between pathos and ousia – for instance, at 301b8.Footnote 27 However, unlike Pohlenz and Tarrant, Friedländer did not attribute this indistinction to confusion on Plato’s part. Rather, he interpreted it as a reflection of Hippias’ conceptual imprecision, which Plato deliberately constructs for dialectical effect. According to Friedländer, Socrates himself is capable of distinguishing ousia, as the essence of the beautiful, from pathos, understood as the state of ‘being-beautiful.’
Other defenders of the dialogue’s authenticity, such as Marion Soreth, have argued that the terms ousia and pathos are not yet employed here in a fully technical Aristotelian sense.Footnote 28 Consequently, one should not expect to find in the Hippias Major a systematic theory of pathos in the later metaphysical sense, but rather a more fluid and context-dependent usage consistent with early Platonic thought.
It is worth directing our attention to a further passage, particularly 300d7–e7, which deserves more careful scrutiny. Here, Hippias reiterates his rejection of Socrates’ claim that two things together can undergo an affection that neither of them individually experiences. Socrates prefaces his reply with his customary assurance that he will now clarify his thought, yet once again, the matter appears to grow more complex rather than simpler. What is the innovation, compared to what was previously said, that is intended to shed light on the argument? It lies in Socrates’ introduction of a new formulation for what had earlier been referred to as paschein and pathēma: now he no longer speaks merely of paschein, but of paschein einai.
According to this new expression, it is possible that something that neither Socrates ‘suffers to be’ (πέπονθα εἶναι), nor does Hippias, may nonetheless be something that both together (ἀμφότεροι) ‘suffer to be’; and that what neither is individually, they may both ‘suffer to be’ (πεπόνθαμεν εἶναι) collectively. Hippias’ remark that this would involve ‘even greater wonders’ (τέρατα ἔτι μείζω) than those previously discussed suggests that he indeed sensed a new level of complexity or paradox in this formulation. The task, then, is to determine what Hippias understood by this reference to ‘even greater wonders.’Footnote 29
An answer may be found in the two types of examples Hippias offers in reply. Earlier (300b), he had referred only to pathos and pathēma. But now, through the examples he introduces, Hippias reveals that he primarily understands pathos in its most literal and immediate sense – namely, undergoing something painful or harmful: being in pain, being wounded, being beaten (cf. κεκμηκώς and τετρωμένος, 301a1–2). In such cases, it is indeed impossible for a pair to suffer something that neither individual suffers separately.
This same impossibility (and here we move to the second type of example) applies to predicative judgments where the verb ‘to be’ functions as a copula – for example, ‘Hippias and Socrates are just, wise, young, old’ (301a4–5). The disjunction between pathos and ousia that Hippias proposes at 301b8 must be understood in reference to these two sets of examples: the impossibility he highlights concerns both types of judgments – those that involve ‘being,’ where ousia refers to what is predicated of the subject, and those that involve affections in the immediate, experiential sense described above. Since this disjunction effectively summarizes the examples previously considered, the expression ἢ πάθος ἢ οὐσίαν need not, in my view, imply any identity or confusion between the two terms. It does not, therefore, indicate a conceptual conflation, as Friedländer and, more recently, Paul Woodruff have suggested.Footnote 30 Rather, if anything, it reflects a restricted understanding of ousia and especially of pathos, one that does not go beyond the common, non-technical meanings of the terms.Footnote 31
In other words, Hippias continues to understand only the distinction between paschein and einai, while he evidently has not fully grasped the implications of the notion paschein einai. Socrates, however, by introducing this new expression, intends to identify a different type of predication, to which he applies the principle stated earlier – namely, that a pair may undergo an affection that is not predicated of either element individually. These are cases of judgments in which the verb ‘to be’ typically appears, and which, according to the ordinary usage presupposed by Hippias, would not normally be classified as pathē. In such judgments, however, ‘being’ (that is, paschein einai) designates something that does not inherently belong to each item considered individually, insofar as it is predicated of the pair (amphotera), but not of each element separately (ekateron). The phrase paschein einai thus qualifies einai in an accidental sense, where paschein means ‘to happen’ or ‘to occur,’ and may serve as a near synonym of the more common expression tynchanein einai (‘happen to be’).Footnote 32 What Hippias considers impossible is precisely this kind of predication. We are thus likely dealing with the first philosophical formulation of a distinction between different meanings of ‘being’ and the function of the copula.
The ‘greater wonders,’ then, lie in the fact that the possibility Socrates puts forward – and which Hippias rejects – now concerns not only affections in the conventional sense, but being itself. Since the scope is now broader, the marvel is all the more significant. If Hippias maintains the impossibility of the earlier examples, then he must find it even more troubling when this impossibility is applied to ousia, the being of things. A denial of this impossibility would be, for him, even more unsettling.
As we have seen, the example Socrates provides to illustrate the kind of possibility he defends is that of ‘one’ and ‘two,’ further specified in terms of ‘odd’ and ‘even.’ Being ‘one’ is a pathos of this kind – just as are the later examples of the paradoxical pair ‘rational–irrational’ (ῥητὰ–ἄρρητα),Footnote 33 as well as the very designations ‘each–both’ (ἑκάτερον–ἀμφότερον). Socrates will even claim that there are ‘myriads’ of such affections. The corollary that may be drawn from this is the following: if it is possible to attribute a predicate to a pair of entities, but not to either of them individually – or, conversely, to each individually but not to both together – then we are in the presence of a pathos.Footnote 34 In contrast, if something is the ousia – the essential being – shared by multiple subjects, then it cannot be predicated of them collectively without also being predicated of each individually, and vice versa. The distinction lies precisely in this: pathos allows for distributive irregularity; ousia does not.
In the specific case of the definition under examination, the pathos that Socrates identifies is the ‘being through sight and hearing’ (δι’ ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς εἶναι), which constitutes an affection of pleasures (302e) and may be defined as a pathos for two distinct reasons.
(1) The expression is synonymous with ‘that which comes into being through sight and hearing’ (τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ ὄψει τε καὶ ἀκοῇ γιγνόμενον), and as we saw in the Euthyphro, gignesthai is a pathos – in this case, the fact of being perceived through sight or hearing. In this sense, Plato could also reject a definition that referred solely to the pleasures of sight or solely to those of hearing: Is something beautiful because it is perceived by sight, or is being perceived by sight something that merely happens to the beautiful? Plato would evidently favor the second alternative. For being perceived is a pathos – it presupposes the prior existence of that which is perceived and its already possessing the predicate ‘beautiful.’ It is not the mere fact of being perceived that makes something beautiful. However, Plato is here confronting a well-established definition, one that is at least partially correct, and thus requires a specific, ad hoc refutation.Footnote 35 This necessity leads him to emphasize the definition’s accidental character.
(2) The expression ‘being through sight and hearing’ also qualifies as a pathos insofar as, according to the aforementioned corollary, a pathos is that which may be predicated of both pleasures taken together (ἀμφότερα), but not of each individually (cf. 299c; 302e6). Yet the precise determination of this pathos proves theoretically problematic, since nothing is in fact perceived simultaneously by both sight and hearing. As Socrates observes – with Hippias’ full assent – what is pleasant to sight is not pleasant to both sight and hearing; the same applies to what is pleasant to hearing.Footnote 36 The expression, then, can only refer to the aggregate of pleasures perceived by sight and by hearing,Footnote 37 serving merely to indicate the extension of the concept under consideration.Footnote 38
It is for this reason that Plato resorts to a refutation strategy that is characteristic of his dialectical method. Assuming that the totality of beautiful things coincides with the totality of pleasures derived from sight and hearing, it becomes legitimate to ask what justifies calling both – that is, the pleasures of sight and those of hearing – ‘beautiful.’ This is precisely the question raised at 300a9–b1: What is that common element present in both and in each individually that makes them beautiful? (cf. 302d). According to the account (logos) provided, this common element should be ‘that which is pleasant for sight and hearing,’ which, however, turns out to be a pathos. In this sense, we find a first point of convergence with the Euthyphro: what the logos has yielded is merely a pathos. The analogies with the Euthyphro could be extended even further, were we to find the pathos–ousia opposition formulated in the same terms.
In this regard, it is worth examining 302b6 ff., which contains the only instance in the Hippias Major where Socrates uses the term ousia in a sense comparable to that found in the Euthyphro. Here, Socrates reiterates that what had been sought was that which makes both pleasures – and each individually – beautiful, given that the pleasures of sight and of hearing are beautiful according to both these modalities. He claims, in line with his earlier exposition of the thesis, that they must be beautiful thanks to the ousia that belongs to both (amphotera), rather than to something ‘lacking in one or the other’ (κατὰ τὰ ἕτερα ἀπολειπομένῃ).
Of particular interest in this passage is the transition from the feminine forms amphoterai and hekatera (clearly referring to the pleasures, ἡδοναί) to the neuter amphotera. As has been noted in prior scholarship,Footnote 39 the neuter here must refer not to the pleasures themselves, but to the two feminine terms considered collectively – that is, to the expression ‘both and each’ (ἀμφότεραι τε καὶ ἑκατέρα). Thus, the ousia in question must be something that is predicated both of the pleasures of sight and of hearing taken together, and of each of them individually.
It is also important to observe that the ousia to which Socrates refers is said to be lacking in one of the two cases. This detail strongly suggests that in this particular context οὐσία cannot mean ‘essence’ in the strictest sense. Indeed, Socrates speaks of οὐσία even in reference to that which is predicated of both but not of each, or of each but not both – precisely what he had earlier described as a pathos.Footnote 40 Ousia, therefore, appears here to bear a meaning closer to that of ‘mode of being.’ When we say that ‘they are beautiful,’ the verb ‘to be’ in this case denotes ‘being both’ and ‘being each’; in other cases, οὐσία denotes ‘being both but not each,’ or vice versa.
Nonetheless, this does not entirely preclude the possibility that ousia already carries a more specific sense, approaching that of ‘essence.’ Even in the passage at hand, Socrates, when referring to ousia, invokes a point he had made earlier. The passage to which he refers can only be 300a9–b2, where he speaks of ‘something identical and common’ (τι τὸ αὐτό … κοινόν) that ‘makes them beautiful’ (ὅ ποιεῖ αὐτὰς καλὰς εἶναι) and ‘is present in them both collectively and individually’ (ἔπεστι κοινῇ καὶ ἑκατέρᾳ ἰδίᾳ). This ‘something,’ then, could plausibly be designated by the term οὐσία, with a meaning close to ‘essence’ in the strongest sense: that in which the beautiful consists; that by virtue of which something may be called beautiful; that which exercises the characteristic causality of the Forms. Moreover, Socrates explicitly affirms that he still believes this to be the case (καὶ ἔτι νῦν οἴομαι, 302c7).
We are thus situated in what may be described as the critical gestation phase of the technical meaning of the term ousia, which in Plato begins to acquire more specific semantic values, even though it may continue to be used in its more conventional sense.Footnote 41 There is, therefore, no inconsistency in the terminology employed, contrary to the claims made by some interpreters (see earlier in this paper). When Socrates refers to ousia at 302c, he is alluding to the definition that has not been found – that is, to the ousia that ought to have explained why the pleasures in question are beautiful. When he speaks of pathos at 302e6, by contrast, he is referring to the definition that was in fact offered, which turns out to be merely an accidental predicate.Footnote 42
The fundamental situation here thus mirrors that of the Euthyphro: οὐσία was what was sought, while what was actually supplied by the logos was only a pathos – in this case, of pleasures, but indirectly also of the beautiful itself.Footnote 43 The meaning of pathos here is immediately distinct from its usage in the Euthyphro, where it denoted ‘undergoing’ or ‘being affected by’ something. However, in the Hippias Major, the particular kind of definition under examination leads to the identification of a still more specific meaning of pathos, along with a distinctive kind of predication – namely, something that is not predicated of a thing in itself, but only of a thing considered in conjunction with others.Footnote 44 What these two uses of pathos have in common is their proximity to the notion of accident, in the sense of a predicate that does not belong to the logos of the ousia: for example, being loved by the gods in the case of the hosion, or being pleasant to sight and hearing in the case of the beautiful.
The analysis of the Hippias Major therefore shows that both pathos and ousia may be employed in their ordinary, pre-theoretical senses. At the same time, however, the dialogue reveals more specific, philosophically salient uses of these terms – uses of which Plato is fully aware, and which already display a notable level of conceptual precision. Nevertheless, as with many central notions in Plato’s philosophy, these uses are not introduced through the imposition of a rigid or prescriptive technical vocabulary.
This Platonic conception of pathos ultimately displays a remarkable continuity: the meaning the term initially assumes in the Euthyphro reappears in the Sophist, where it proves to be rich in implications.Footnote 45 The paschein einai of the Hippias Major, as we have seen, anticipates usages that are found in both the Parmenides and the Sophist. In the dialogues examined here, it is possible to discern the notion of accidental predication at the very moment of its conceptual emergence: pathos is understood as something that pertains to the realm of becoming, and therefore does not contribute to the determination of immutable essence, though it may nonetheless constitute a predicate of significant relevance. In Aristotle, however, pathos will not become the standard term for expressing accidental predication.
The interest of this opposition between pathos and ousia lies in the fact that it articulates one of the fundamental polarities of Platonic thought. Yet the extension of pathos toward ousia, already suggested in the Euthyphro, intimates a possible interaction, communication, or mediation between these two domains. In this sense, it anticipates one of the central motifs of later Platonic speculation.
