Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 May 2016
Citizens’ demand for social insurance is as emphatic as is its supply.Surveys reveal that citizens overwhelmingly agree that it should be thegovernment's responsibility to provide health care for the sick (98percent); to provide a decent standard of living for the old (96.1 percent); andto provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed (67.8 percent). And,indeed, every rich democracy has social policy programs addressing these (andother) risks. But support for social insurance varies across countries, as doesits supply. In fact, there is a fairly close correlation between how supportivecitizens are of social policy and how generous social policy programs are. Thiscorrelation is well documented (see also Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3), especiallyin the work by Clem Brooks and Jeff Manza (Arts and Gelissen 2001; Brooks andManza 2006a, 2006b, 2007; Burstein 1998, 2003; Coughlin 1980; Flavin 2012;Gelissen 2002; Gilens 2005, 2009). But the relationship between public opinionand social policy making is not well understood: “mass opinion is… the great black box of contemporary welfare state politics”(Brooks and Manza 2007, 16).
The long neglect of citizen preferences as a core ingredient of social policymaking is surprising, for a variety of reasons. First, the welfare stateliterature typically restricts its sample to (rich) democracies. Therefore, theidea that public policy reflects citizen preferences should not becontroversial, at least with respect to important, visible, and durable policiessuch as those underpinning welfare states. In fact, congruence between citizenpreferences and policy output is a core part of many definitions of democracy.Second, and as previously mentioned, Clem Brooks and Jeff Manza haveconvincingly argued that existing accounts are “reaching for, but notgrasping, public opinion” (Brooks and Manza 2007, 25). Although citizenpreferences are greatly understudied in the welfare state literature (or wereuntil very recently), all main welfare state theories are, in principle,compatible with the conjecture that social policy making reflects citizenpreferences; some theories even heavily rely on a link between mass preferencesand outcomes (the Power Resources Theory, for example, assumes that partiesaggregate and implement distinct citizen preferences).
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