To say that Raja found Razak's proposals jarring would be an understatement. They came with a demand that was loaded with political dynamite: UMNO must have the monopoly of leadership over the Malays – including those in Singapore.

Raja recoiled at the very idea of it. To submit to them would be tantamount to surrendering the PAP's non-communal vision, and risking Singapore's future. He was not alone in recognising the dangerous implications for the party and Singapore. Toh Chin Chye was as vehemently opposed.

The two leaders voiced their concerns to Lee when he consulted them on the urgent matter on 28 July 1964, almost immediately after Goh Keng Swee's phone update on his ongoing talks with Razak in KL that same day. It was a live situation, with the Goh-Razak negotiations still being conducted in KL.

According to Goh, the Malaysian deputy premier had made two offers. The first was “cooperation”: a coalition government, with the PAP represented in the Malaysian Cabinet, but on condition that Lee step down as prime minister. Razak, who deeply distrusted Lee, had stressed that “Lee was unacceptable to the central government in any basic settlement.”

Goh had asked if, as a quid pro quo for Lee's departure, Albar would be removed, but Razak dismissed the idea, saying that he had complete control over Albar and the Utusan Melayu. This admission was hardly assuring to Goh; in fact, it appeared to point to Razak's complicity in the riots. Goh concluded: “He was involved in it, and it was clearly his intention to remove Mr Lee from office. That was the purpose of Albar's campaign.”

The other option was “co-existence” – no Cabinet seat for the PAP, no political interference in each other's territories, and no propaganda campaigns for the time being, but on the condition that the PAP deal with Malays only through Khir Johari, who also led the UMNO liaison committee in Singapore.