On 14 October 1979, Vietnamese-led forces in Kampuchea fired two 82 mm mortar rounds into Thai territory near its border. One hit a crowded refugee camp, killing and wounding many. It was the latest in a series of provocative actions by the Vietnamese as they shelled Khmer Rouge strongholds and refugee enclaves along the Thai-Kampuchea border. The escalating border clashes raised tensions to the highest since Vietnam invaded Kampuchea in late 1978, and stoked Thai fears that the Vietnamese troops would cross into Thailand.
Raja was seized by the urgency for ASEAN to get a grip of the volatile situation. He worried that the border clashes could draw Thailand into the conflict through accident or miscalculation, and this in turn could bring in China. He wrote to Malaysian foreign minister Ahmad Rithauddeen, who was then chairman of the ASEAN standing committee, suggesting an early ASEAN meeting “to discuss the border situation and collectively to be seen as giving moral support to Thailand”.
In his letter dated 26 October 1979, Raja said international reactions to the Thai-Kampuchea border situation would depend very much on ASEAN's lead. Rithauddeen, however, did not think a meeting was necessary. In his reply dated 9 November, the Malaysian minister said a meeting might give the wrong impression of an imminent invasion or attack on Thailand by Vietnam and cause “undue panic”.
This exchange showed how it had become second nature for Raja to think in terms of ASEAN when faced with a regional development – his instinct was to get the group together and to present a united position. But it also exposed the political reality: he had to work within the comfort level of his ASEAN counterparts.
These duelling factors came into play in one of his most ambitious initiatives: for ASEAN to co-sponsor a United Nations resolution to call for an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea. In his thinking, such a withdrawal would help defuse the situation on the Thai border in the short term, and promote some sort of political settlement in the long term. He envisaged this as a prelude to the process of determining, by free elections, which leaders really represented Kampuchea.
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