Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
    Show more authors
  • You may already have access via personal or institutional login
  • Select format
  • Publisher:
    Cambridge University Press
    Publication date:
    05 June 2012
    15 March 2010
    ISBN:
    9780511750663
    9780521838436
    9780521547321
    Dimensions:
    (228 x 152 mm)
    Weight & Pages:
    0.66kg, 412 Pages
    Dimensions:
    (228 x 152 mm)
    Weight & Pages:
    0.5kg, 412 Pages
You may already have access via personal or institutional login
  • Selected: Digital
    Add to cart View cart Buy from Cambridge.org

    Book description

    Seeing Wittgenstein Anew is a collection which examines Ludwig Wittgenstein's remarks on the concept of aspect-seeing, showing that it was not simply one more topic of investigation in Wittgenstein's later writings but rather a pervasive and guiding concept in his efforts to turn philosophy's attention to the actual conditions of our common life in language. The essays in this 2010 volume open up novel paths across familiar fields of thought: the objectivity of interpretation, the fixity of the past, the acquisition of language, and the nature of human consciousness. Significantly, they exemplify how continuing consideration of the interrelated phenomena of aspect-seeing might produce a fruitful way of doing philosophy in a new century.

    Reviews

    '… the articles open a new path of inquiry, one that could not have been opened without the connection to aspect-seeing … the book contains many more successful arguments for seeing Wittgenstein anew.'

    Source: Journal of the History of Philosophy

    Refine List

    Actions for selected content:

    Select all | Deselect all
    • View selected items
    • Export citations
    • Download PDF (zip)
    • Save to Kindle
    • Save to Dropbox
    • Save to Google Drive

    Save Search

    You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

    Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
    ×

    Contents


    Page 2 of 2


    • 16 - The Enormous Danger
      pp 338-356
    • View abstract

      Summary

      In the midst of Wittgenstein's discussion of aspect-seeing he warns us of what he calls an enormous danger. Wittgenstein's fear of wanting to make fine distinctions goes to the heart of his philosophy. Giving in to the desire to make fine distinctions may plausibly be interpreted as permitting yourself to be drawn into the deep disquietudes from which it was Wittgenstein's goal to release us. When Wittgenstein names the enormous danger, he remarks almost parenthetically, "the primitive language-game which children are taught needs no justification; attempts at justification need to be rejected". The implication is that the roots of the enormous danger rest in that old epistemological earth: the demand for justification, in particular, the demand for a justification of the difference we want to draw between seeing the figure as a duck and as a rabbit.

    Page 2 of 2


    Metrics

    Altmetric attention score

    Full text views

    Total number of HTML views: 0
    Total number of PDF views: 0 *
    Loading metrics...

    Book summary page views

    Total views: 0 *
    Loading metrics...

    * Views captured on Cambridge Core between #date#. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

    Usage data cannot currently be displayed.

    Accessibility standard: Unknown

    Why this information is here

    This section outlines the accessibility features of this content - including support for screen readers, full keyboard navigation and high-contrast display options. This may not be relevant for you.

    Accessibility Information

    Accessibility compliance for the PDF of this book is currently unknown and may be updated in the future.