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Chapter 5 - Transcendental Idealism

What and Why?

from Part II - Space, Time, and Idealism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 May 2026

Paul Guyer
Affiliation:
Brown University, Rhode Island
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Summary

This chapter argues that we must interpret the meaning of Kant’s conception of transcendental idealism from his arguments for it. It argues that the popular contrast between “one-world” and “two-world” interpretations of transcendental idealism is misleading, because Kant (and his contemporaries) always recognize an ontological distinction between things outside us and our representations of them (thus, two worlds) – the question is, rather, whether Kant leaves it open that things as they are in themselves might be spatio-temporal or actually denies that they are. This chapter argues that his main argument for transcendental idealism is clearly intended to prove that things as they are in themselves are not spatio-temporal, and cannot be interpreted as leaving that question open. It also argues that Kant’s argument for this assertion is not sound; rather, it depends on an assumption that the general propositions about space and time made in his “metaphysical expositions” of those concepts as well as the specific propositions of geometry are necessarily true of whatever objects they are true of at all, to which he is not entitled. Thus the chapter argues that we can accept Kant’s transcendental theory of experience without accepting transcendental idealism.

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  • Transcendental Idealism
  • Paul Guyer, Brown University, Rhode Island
  • Book: Selected Essays on Kant II
  • Online publication: 14 May 2026
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009647175.009
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  • Transcendental Idealism
  • Paul Guyer, Brown University, Rhode Island
  • Book: Selected Essays on Kant II
  • Online publication: 14 May 2026
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009647175.009
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Transcendental Idealism
  • Paul Guyer, Brown University, Rhode Island
  • Book: Selected Essays on Kant II
  • Online publication: 14 May 2026
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009647175.009
Available formats
×