Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-2n9c9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-17T05:03:47.803Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

8 - Status cues and expertise assessment in groups

How group members size one another up … and why it matters

from Part IV - When ascriptive status trumps achieved status in teams

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Jone L. Pearce
Affiliation:
University of California, Irvine
Get access

Summary

As contemporary organizations increasingly rely on task groups to perform complex, knowledge-intensive work, the ability of these groups to effectively leverage the knowledge and expertise of individual members has become ever more important. It is almost invariably the case that groups operating in real-world task environments will be composed of members who differ in the task-relevant knowledge and expertise that they bring to the group. These differences typically correlate with differences in education, experience, training, or natural ability, and can emerge naturally or as the result of intentional design decisions that place individuals with greater expertise in groups with less-expert individuals. Yet, regardless of the origin of expertise differences, a key challenge facing groups with expertise diversity is to ensure that members know who their more expert teammates are so that superior expertise is leveraged in decision making and problem solving. A growing body of research evidence suggests that task groups perform better when members are able to accurately identify and then defer to their more expert members (Bunderson, 2003a; Bottger, 1984; Libby, Trotman, and Zimmer, 1987; Littlepage et al., 1995; Littlepage, Robison, and Reddington, 1997; Stewart and Stasser, 1995).

However, the research evidence also suggests that the identification of member expertise is not a simple or straightforward problem (Miner, 1984; Littlepage et al., 1995; Littlepage and Mueller, 1997; Littlepage, Robison, and Reddington, 1997; Trotman, Yetton, and Zimmer, 1983). Expertise is not a visible or observable characteristic. As a result, group members must rely on those characteristics that are visible and observable in drawing inferences about the relative expertise of group members. But these manifest characteristics are not equally valid (i.e., accurate) or reliable (i.e., consistent and dependable) as indicators of actual expertise differences. Consequently, groups can, and often do, make attribution errors by deferring to members who “seem” like they should be experts but are not, or by overlooking members who do possess valuable expertise but do not give that impression. The result is squandered human capital and underperforming groups.

Information

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Book purchase

Temporarily unavailable

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×