Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 September 2026
This chapter examines and clarifies Aristotle’s views concerning truth, truthaptness, truthbearers, truth-conditions, and temporal relativism and argues against two common readings of Aristotle. First, while Aristotle is often credited with the first correspondence theory of truth (wherein items such as beliefs and declarative sentences are true if and only if there is some item – such as a fact or obtaining state of affairs – to which the relevant belief or declarative sentence corresponds), I argue that there is little reason to attribute a substantive correspondence theory of truth to Aristotle. Secondly, although it is often thought that Aristotle is inclined towards a temporalist view according to which truthbearers vary in truth across times while undergoing mere Cambridge change, I argue that Aristotle instead held that truthbearers do not undergo any change at all. This, I suggest, has interesting implications for Aristotle’s views concerning temporalism and apparent changes in truth value.
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