Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 September 2026
This chapter discusses the importance of the phenomenon of epistemic relativity for Plato’s metaphysics and conception of truth. The argument from epistemic relativity, applied to attributes in the phenomenal world, is Plato’s favored strategy to highlight the need for a separate ontological domain of intelligible essences exempt from relativity. It is also a starting point for his metaphysical conception of truth. After a general discussion of the Platonic perspective on relative attributes, I introduce a set of terminological distinctions that help to categorize his various uses of the truth terminology. I then turn to the Phaedo, as it is the first dialogue to provide a broad exposition of Plato’s new metaphysical vision. I trace the various characteristic aspects of his truth terminology, as they emerge throughout this dialogue, and link them to his idea of philosophy and the underlying metaphysical conception. The last section discusses how a passage in the final proof of immortality qualifies the stark metaphysical dichotomy of truth and appearance by pointing to the possibility of certain kinds of determinate truth pertaining to objects in the phenomenal world.
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