How does a protest feel? This chapter shows that affect is central to our ordinary ideas of protest and a site on which a gathering’s political legibility is contested. Public discourses about the Riots/Uprising and anti-Prop. 187 march indicate shared expectations that protests be affectively rational and those affects be politically directed. Focusing on anger, the chapter finds that the political anger of protest has social sense and is moderated and directed to collective ends. Affective rationality is thus connected to social intentionality and contributes to consolidating the performative effect of an instrumental political collectivity. These terms of legible political anger, however, are racialized in ways that circumscribe the legibility of Black protest. As the chapter shows, a constrained political anger was more available to the Latino-coded participants of the anti-Prop. 187 march than it was to participants of the Riots/Uprising, who were depicted erroneously as mostly Black. Within hegemonic discourses, the affective experiences of both were made opaque. Drawing on Stanley Cavell, the chapter argues that public gatherings are affectively charged performative invitations and concludes that their political unintelligibility instances an affective opacity and refusal of those invitations.