I began this book with Figure 1.1, repeated here as Figure 18.1. The first chapters were designed to flesh out the component parts of this framework: the second chapter developed the concept of emotions as resources; the third chapter addressed the strategic use of those resources; the fourth chapter outlined the nature of intervener games; the fifth deepened the analysis of the opponent strategies; the sixth formulated hypotheses based on the work of the previous chapters. In the next eleven chapters, I applied this framework to intervention in the Western Balkans. Starting from the upper left of the diagram, the empirical chapters examined intervention “games” in Kosovo (standards before status, status with standards, Ahtisaari Plan), South Serbia (Konculj Agreement), Macedonia (Ohrid Accord), Bosnia (Dayton Accord), and Montenegro (Belgrade Agreement, Ulcinj Agreement),

In each case I identified the presence or absence of widely shared experiences relating to intervention and conflict – status reversal, prejudice and stigma, violence and victimization. The residues of these experiences were treated in their specific forms as the emotions of resentment, contempt, anger, fear, and hatred. I then considered the role of these “emotion resources” in conjunction with more standard structural variables. Within the case studies, I identified dozens of key junctures and strategic decision points for testing the hypotheses. Although the results of these tests were often nuanced, the role of emotions was often clear and powerful.