In this chapter I will discuss the most prominent extant proposed explanations for the Question. My goal in each case will be to derive particular lesson(s) that will prove instructive in Chapters 5–7. The extant explanations are: (1) the explanation in terms of the existence of a necessary being; (2) the explanation according to which empty worlds (in which nothing whatsoever exists) are unintelligible or incoherent; (3) the axiarchist explanation according to which there is something rather than nothing because it is good for there to be something rather than nothing; (4) the nomological explanation according to which laws of nature explain why there is something rather than nothing; (5) the probabilistic explanation according to which there is something rather than nothing because there are vastly more possible worlds in which there is something than there are possible worlds in which there is nothing; and (6) the explanation according to which there is something rather than nothing because all possibilities obtain, including the possibility that there is something rather than nothing, as this is the least arbitrary way for reality to be.