The doctrine of the clausula rebus sic stantibus is the familiar rubric under which are classified various materials bearing on the revision or termination of treaties. Much that the phrase connotes proves on examination to be too mischievous or vague for serious consideration. Yet there remains “a legal residuum,” in Dr. Lauterpacht’s phrase, “which, although of a limited compass, is capable of application by a judicial tribunal.” English jurists have suggested, somewhat cautiously, that a discussion of the implied clause might be illuminated by an examination of the principle of frustration in the private law of contracts. And an analogy is also suggested between obsolescent treaties and restrictive covenants which, because of an essential change in circumstances, equity will no longer enforce. The matter is of such contemporary importance that international law cannot afford to leave unexamined any juristic material which promises to be suggestive. And if in the end the conclusion is reached that the principle of rebus sic stantibus can have only the most limited application to so-called obsolete treaties, this result will be none the less significant in clarifying the true nature of the problem.