The story is told of F.E. Smith, the future Lord Birkenhead L.C., that he and a friend were once walking along a narrow residential street when they came upon a couple of men arguing with each other from the upper floors of houses on opposite sides of the street. “They will never agree”, Smith is supposed to have said, “they're arguing from different premises!”

The Sale of Goods Act 1979 (“the Act”) uses two terms, “property” and “title”, which one would normally associate with ownership. Of “title”, there is no definition in the Act; of “property”, there is one. But the definition, as we shall see, does not carry us very far. There has been much debate on the meaning of the two terms. The approach advocated by Battersby and Preston in a deservedly well-known article appears to have gained considerable acceptance.5 This paper hopes to present, as a theoretical possibility, an alternative interpretation of the uses and meanings of those concepts and of their relationship. It would be useful to begin with a brief description of “ownership” since “property” and “title” are associated with it.

A Person convicted of a crime suffers punishment—a fine, a community sentence, or perhaps a custodial term. In addition to that sanction, however, conviction of the crime may trigger a variety of disqualifications. The offender may be barred from holding public office, or from serving on a jury. He may be precluded from certain types of employment, or be prevented from driving a vehicle. These consequences may considerably restrict the person's prospects for earning a living or his mobility. Yet the visibility of these measures is low: provisions authorising various disqualifications are scattered throughout the statute books, and are not easy to find. While there is now a considerable body of jurisprudence on sentencing, the principles which should inform the proper use of disqualifications have received little serious attention.