D.19.2.31 contains a reply to a question of law attributed to the late-Republican jurist P. Alfenus Varus. Several people had delivered grain to a carrier which was shot into a common pile in the hold of his ship. Subsequently the carrier returned a share of the grain to one of them before the ship went down. The question is asked if the others can proceed against the carrier in respect of their share by raising an action for onus aversum. This article provides a new insight into the scope and application of this otherwise obscure Roman action, by reference to the role of the tort of conversion in analogous cases at common law.

In the pharmaceutical sector an increasing number of new medicines are large-molecule products, namely biologics derived from living organisms, rather than small-molecule drugs synthesised from chemicals. Unlike small-molecule medicines, which are relatively easy to manufacture, large-molecule products are less stable and harder to produce. We investigate whether the current UK legal system provides an appropriate balance between the protection provided to technology owners and the public interest in accessing medical technologies, especially in times of emergencies. At present, UK law facilitates compulsory licensing of patents but has no equivalent scheme for trade secrets. Our analysis of the legal constraints on potential reforms suggests that a mechanism for compulsory licensing of trade secrets would be compatible with UK domestic law, the European Convention on Human Rights, the World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and other international agreements, provided appropriate safeguards are put in place to balance the rights of intellectual property holders with the public interest. The article contributes a detailed framework for the compulsory licensing of trade secrets, drawing parallels with voluntary technology transfer agreements, including provisions for defining the scope of transfer, maintaining confidentiality, restricting future use, providing fair compensation and ensuring enforceability.

Section 13A of the Insurance Act 2015 implies a term into every insurance contract that if the assured makes a claim under the contract, the insurer must pay any sums due in respect of the claim within a “reasonable time”. It provides contractual remedies, such as damages, in the event of breach. To date, a breach of section 13A has been pleaded in two cases which have resulted in judgments – Quadra Commodities S.A. v XL Insurance Co. S.E. and others [2022] EWHC 431 (Comm) and Delos Shipholding S.A. and others v Allianz Global Corporate and Specialty S.E. and others (“Win Win”) [2024] EWHC 719 (Comm) – and in each case the section 13A claim failed. Informed by the understanding of section 13A adopted in these two cases, this paper suggests that section 13A largely is symbolic. To this end, it considers three points and argues that two of these hinder the efficacy of section 13A.

It is widely assumed that English law adopts a restrictive approach towards tort actions for “wrongful life”. This article reveals the true legal position to be much more complex. A broad distinction exists between cases where the wrong occurred before or at conception and those where it occurred during pregnancy, with claims usually being permitted in the former scenario but not in the latter. In this article, I expose this bifurcation as arbitrary before examining potential solutions for remedying it.

Autonomy theories of contract are influential and have many attractions, not least their compatibility with liberal ideals. However, such theories cannot account for basic features of the common law of contract, in particular: the role of established transaction types, the doctrine of consideration and the phenomenon of contractual obligation. An exchange theory of contract can account for those features of the law. This theory’s liberal credentials can be established by connecting it to an alternative intellectual strand in the liberal tradition, sometimes known as commercial liberalism.

Cases across the common law world have recognised digital assets as property, but the question of how such assets should be protected against interferences remains contested. At present, the “chattel torts” (conversion, trespass and reversionary injury) do not cover digital assets, leaving a gap in protection in respect of digital assets. There have been suggestions that the tort of conversion should be extended to cover digital assets, but this article argues that this extension would be undesirable for two reasons. First, there are fundamental differences between physical and digital assets, meaning that the concepts and thresholds used in the chattel tort context generate uncertain results (and create substantial risks of incorrect results) in the digital asset context. Second, the rules governing the chattel torts are unsatisfactory and contain many negative characteristics, and so extending the chattel torts to digital assets would replicate the same negative characteristics in the digital asset context.

English courts have long professed to apply a “presumption of similarity” when faced with inconclusive foreign law evidence. However, its precise nature and implications remain unclear. Here, I argue that no true “presumption” exists. Instead, courts should only draw an inference, that English and foreign courts would render similar rulings on the same facts, when that conclusion can be reliably drawn. Understanding the “presumption” as a reliable inference helps facilitate the accurate prediction of foreign decisions, resolves various controversies surrounding its “use” in civil proceedings and does not render the proof of foreign law unpredictable or inconvenient in practice.

In the recent history of private law theory, the task of restoring interpersonal justice to a position of chief importance has been undertaken by those who draw from the wellsprings of Kantian philosophy. But in defining the domain of interpersonal justice, Kantians have also narrowly confined it. In this article I offer a post-Kantian approach, taking reference from a method well established in political and moral philosophy, but yet to make a comprehensive impact on private law: contractualism. Contractualism anchors what we owe each other in the notion of interpersonal justification, offering a fresh understanding of persons, nexuses and relational reasoning. I show how this approach tackles key questions in private law – its institutions of empowerment, primary entitlements, remedial norms and practices, and the division of labour between public and private spheres – in a manner preferable to Kantian theory.

Critically engaging with the works of Roger Brownsword, Mireille Hildebrandt and William Lucy, the article addresses the increasing reliance on computer codes and intelligent physical infrastructure as behavioural control tools and its implications for modern state law. It is argued that, if we look at the new developments in the context of broader social and institutional trends (like the rise of Internet platforms), instead of the prospect of code superseding the law, we face complex practical challenges related to the dynamic balance between different modes of guiding and controlling behaviour in legal regulation.